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ECONOMIC CRIMES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA: A SWINGING DOOR POLICY
Cynthia B. Schultz*
INTRODUCTION
Recent changes in the economic and trade position of the People's
Republic of China (China or PRC) in relation to the international
community have resulted in an increased focus on China's domestic
criminal justice system.1 In 1978, China launched the "open-door" pol-
icy,2 providing foreigners with access to Chinese markets. In the same
year, China also adopted the "four modernizations" program3 that
called for reforms in the areas of agriculture, 4 industry," national de-
fense, and science and technology.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Washington College of Law, The American University
I. See Peng Zhen, Explanation on Seven Laws. BEIJING REv., July 13. 1979. at 8
(discussing the role of criminal law and criminal procedure law as being fundamental
to socialist modernization); Shao-Chuan Leng, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China:
Some Preliminary Observations, 73 Nw. U.J. CRIN. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204, 206
(1982) (noting that post-Mao leaders endorsed a revitalization of the criminal justice
and legal systems in carrying out their commitment to socialist modernization): see
also Donovan, The Structure of the Chinese Criminal Justice System: A Comparative
Perspective, 21 U.S. FLA. L. REV. 229 (1987) (providing a detailed analysis of the
current Chinese criminal justice system).
2. See Horsley, The Regulation of China's Foreign Trade, in FoRpkiCI TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CIlNA 5 (M. Moser 2d ed.
1987) (discussing various Chinese regulations on foreign trade). A goal of the open-
door policy was to relax central administrative controls, thereby promoting more inde-
pendence in local enterprises and individuals. Id. at 5. One of the effects of the open-
door policy is an increase in trade. Id.; Guocang Huan, China's Open Door Policy, 39
J. INT'L AFF. 1 (1986) (discussing the political and economic background of the open-
door policy). At the macroeconomic level, Deng's reforms involved decentralizing the
central planning system, introducing price reform, and promoting development of pri-
vate sectors. Id. At the microeconomic level, the Party advocated a more independent
management system. Id.
3. See XUE MUQIAO, CHINA'S SOCIALIST ECONOMY 234-65 (1981) (providing a
historical basis for China's need to modernize). Zhou Enlai originally proposed the
"four modernizations" at the Third National People's Congress (NPC). Id. at 234.
China concentrated on agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technol-
ogy because it dramatically lagged behind capitalist countries in these areas. Id. at
235. In an effort to increase labor productivity, the Chinese government concentrated
on the development of industry to assist the agricultural sector. Id. at 236. The govern-
ment needed the four modernizations program to provide security to strengthen social-
ist modernization. Id. at 241; see also Lussenburg, Joint Venture Investment in the
People's Republic of China: A Continuing Challenge, 63 CAN. B. REV. 545. 545-46
(1986) (discussing the four modernizations).
4. See XuE MUQIAO, supra note 3, at 241, 244-53 (recognizing agriculture as the
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New systemic features have emerged since the open-door policy. For
example, central administrative control, as practiced during the Maoist
period,' began to weaken markedly in the mid-1980s.7 This led to a
greater fragmentation of central power as the Communist party of
China (Party) began to relinquish part of its control to local govern-
ments." The resultant increase in local autonomy created more opportu-
most significant sector in the national economy); see also THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 214-25, 339-40'(M.
Selden ed. 1979) (discussing the formation of agrarian law and rural cooperatives);
Zhan Wu & Liu Wenpau, Agriculture, in CHINA'S SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION 219-
246 (G. Yu ed. 1984) (arguing for the retention of collective farming as opposed to
individual farming with household ownership and land contracts); Khan & Ng Gek-
boo, Achievements and Incentives in Communal Agriculture: The Case of China, in
AGRARIAN SYSTEMS & RURAL DEVELOPMENT 262-73 (D. Ghai ed. 1979) (providing
analysis on individual incentives such as rewards and demerits, and collective incentives
such as agricultural taxation). But see Landy, Agricultural Reforms in China, 39 J.
INT'L AFF. 91, 99-104 (1986) (discussing the negative aspects of the decollectivization
policy). The rural responsibility system is also known as the decollectivization policy.
Id. This system allows individual families to contract for a period of three to fifty years
for the private use of a piece of land in return for certain obligations to the collective.
Id. This combination of private investment and socialist ownership results in disparities
in income distribution and may lead to disharmony in rural areas. Id. at 100. Decollec-
tivization will have a detrimental impact on rural social services. Id. at 101.
5. See XUE MUQIAO, supra note 3, at 253-65 (noting that industrial modernization
requires advanced technology and effective management); Solinger, Industrial Reform:
Decentralization. Differentiation, and the Difficulties, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 105 (1986)
(providing an analysis of the pre-1979 industrial system through the major industrial
reforms of the mid-1980s).
6. See XUE MUQIAO, supra note 3, at 203-33 (discussing the Maoist system of
economic management). Central management set commodity and production targets
that local authorities had to follow. Id. at 204. In addition, central management con-
trolled all revenue and expenditures and allocated funding to the provincial and local
governments. Id.; see also Hong, The Implications of Reform for Ideology, State and
Society' in China, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 77 (1986) (noting Maoist philosophy on central
control).
7. See Hong, supra note 6, at 78-80 (discussing the retreat of the state's role in
society); Lee, Foreign Trade Decentralization: Its Origin and Future, 4 CHINA TRADE
66 (1981) (discussing the authority given to local, provincial, and autonomous govern-
ments to control the export and import of locally produced goods). Relaxing central
economic management by relinquishing direct trading power to local governments cre-
ates a higher dependency on foreign imports. Id. at 5; You Chunmei, Current Adminis-
trative Reform in China, 52 INT'L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 123, 126 (1986) (providing a
detailed study on the administrative reform of central provincial and local government
bureaucracies).
8. See XUE MUQIAO, supra note 3, at 210-33 (discussing the process of the man-
agement of state enterprises and the national economy involving reforms in financial
administration and hierarchial structural power).
For laws addressing the transfer of power over domestic matters to local levels, see
RESOLUTION OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
REVISING SEVERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (promulgated on July I, 1979, and effective on Jan. 1, 1980), reprinted in THE
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982 162 (1987) [hereinafter PRC
LAWS, 1979-1982] (amending the Resolution to empower local governments with lead-
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nity for personal and institutional corruption.'
In addition, with the decentralization of control, the Party lost much
of its moral authority.' 0 During the tenure of Communist Party Chair-
man Mao Tsetung, the Party relied on various rectification campaigns
to impose elements of fear on the Chinese people."1 Although, the
ership and decision making authority as opposed to supervisory authority): RESOLU-
TION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AUTHOR-
IZING PROVINCES, AUTONOMOUS REGIONS, AND MUNICIPALITIES DIRECTLY UNDER
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH STANDING COMMITTEES OF PEOPLE'S CON-
GRESSES AND CHANGE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES TO PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS IN
1979 (promulgated on Sept. 13, 1979, and effective Jan. I, 1980). reprinted in PRC
LAWS, 1979-1982, supra, at 165 (allowing local governments to establish standing
committees); DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF TilE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS REGARDING DIRECT ELECTION AT TIlE COUNTY LEV EL (promulgated on
Feb. 12, 1980), reprinted in PRC LAWS, 1979-1982. supra, at 197 (allowing experi-
mental direct elections at the local and provincial level and in autonomous regions);
RESOLUTION OF THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS RE-
VISING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC LAW OF TilE LOCAL PEOPLE'S CON-
GRESSES AND LOCAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CIIINA
(adopted on Dec. 10, 1982), reprinted in PRC LAWS, 1979-1982, supra. at 366 (relin-
quishing broad powers to local governments); ORGANIC LAW OF TIlE LOCAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESSES AND LOCAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS OF TIlE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (promulgated and effective on Dec. 10. 1982), reprinted in PRC LAws. 1979-
1982, supra, at 368, as amended b' DECISION OF THE STANDING COM'ITTEE OF TIlE
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS REGARDING THE REVISION OF TIlE ORGANIC LAW OF
THE LOCAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES AND LOCAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMIENTS OF TIlE PEO-
PI.ES REPUBLIC OF CHINA (promulgated on Dec. 2, 1986), reprinted in TIlE LAWS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1983-86 328 (1987) (delineating broad powers to
local governments) [hereinafter PRC LAWS, 1983-19861.
For legislation addressing the transfer of control on foreign trade matters to local
governments, see DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF TIlE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS ON AUTHORIZING THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN ECoNO.%UC RELATIONS AND
TRADE (MOFERT) TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF RATIFICATION OF TIlE FORMER FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT COMMISSION (adopted on Mar. 5, 1983) reprinted in PRC LAws,
1983-1986, supra, at 19 (empowering MOFERT to handle foreign economic relations):
see also supra note 2, at 7-14 (discussing the changes in the foreign trade management
structure of the PRC after the decentralization of trading authority). MOFERT is
responsible for setting foreign trade policy with the State Planning Commission and
supervises local foreign trade bureaus. Id. at 9. Local foreign trade bureaus share lead-
ership with MOFERT. Id. at 11. National Foreign Trade Corporations (N FTC). once
possessing a monopolistic role over trade management and contracts, now allow local
authorities to supervise local branches of the N FTC. Id.
9. See Horsley, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting a Chinese official who notes that de-
centralization has led to corrupt activities such as the importation of luxury items and
the exportation of consumer goods in short supply domestically).
10. See Fenwick, Crime in Post-Mao China: Toward the Construction of an Inte-
grated Social Systems Theory, I I INT'L J. COIP. & APP. CRIM. JUST. 177 (1987)
(investigating changes in social behavior and societal reaction to modernization). The
lack of law during the Cultural Revolution brought a decrease in respect for moral
authority. Id. at 184. Chinese citizens began to doubt the Chinese government and its
ideology. Id.
Ii. See Johnson, Politics. Power and Prevention: The People's Republic of China
Case, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 449, 451-52, (1986) (identifying police power, economic
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Party under Deng Xiaoping has imposed similar campaigns against
crime and corruption, albeit to a lesser degree, attempts to instill fear
have failed.12 Moreover, the Party recently established a two-tiered
pricing system,' 3 which created its own array of economic crimes such
as speculation and arbitrage. 4
Both the open-door policy and the four modernizations brought an
increase in economic crimes such as speculative arbitrage, speculation,
extortion, bribery, and embezzlement. 5 To combat the deleterious ef-
power, political power, ideological power, and diversionary power as methods exploited
by Mao to retain social control over the Chinese people).
12. See Fenwick, supra note 10, at 187 (noting that a change of focus from politi-
cal ideology under Mao, to a legal-rational authority promoted by Deng, is responsible
for lawless behavior). But see id. (noting that anticorruption campaigns in the 1980s
have had a deterrent effect on crime); see also Hong, supra note 6, at 81 (noting the
decline in the importance of ideology "demoralized" many government officials who
spent much of their lives promoting Maoist ideology). Deng Xiaoping, after his acces-
sion to leadership of the Communist party in 1977, instituted drastic changes in eco-
nomic and administrative reform. Id. at 82-84. Deng's bureaucratic reforms en-
couraged private business and created a "new elite." Id. at 84-89.
13. See XUE MUQIAO, supra note 3, at 135-62 (providing background material on
the law of value, price policy, and the reform of the Chinese price control system). Xuc
Muqiao, a distinguished Chinese economist, advocates a degree of independence when
setting prices at the local level and for individual enterprises. Id. at 156.
14. Economists Discuss Economic Results, Xinhua [in Chinese], June 8, 1983,
trans. in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, DAILY REPORT: PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA [hereinafter F.B.I.S.-CHI], June 9, 1983, at KI0 (noting that the
long-practiced system of the state setting prices distorted the market because the prices
failed to reflect real value). In 1987 the State Council on Regulations identified three
forms of pricing: state-fixed, state-approved, and market-determined prices. Specula-
tion, Corruption Hampers China's Price Reform, Investor's Daily (Los Angeles), Nov.
2, 1987. at 10 [hereinafter Speculation] (noting that state-fixed prices usually govern
important raw materials, state-approved prices govern consumer goods, and market-
determined prices are allowed for vegetables and light consumer products). One of the
inherent problems with different price-controlling mechanisms is known as "double-
tracking," where both state and market prices are allowed. Id. Doubletracking creates
price differentials, making it economically profitable to buy at lower state prices and
sell at higher market demand prices. Id. Those most responsible for price increases are
the state-owned enterprises. Group to Trace 'Backstage Boss,' China Daily, Sept. 4,
1987, at I. Those state-owned enterprises most guilty of imposing price increases pro-
duce rolled steel, timber, cement, chemical fertilizers, electric power, and petroleum.
Id. Price subsidies in 1986 reached U.S. $56 billion, one-fourth of state revenues. Id.
Doubletracking also creates income disparities between state-supervised wages and pri-
vate sector earnings. Id.
15. See Rider, White Collar Crime: The Unacceptable Face of Communism, 2
COMPANY LAW. 85 (1981) (discussing examples of white collar crimes, such as specu-
lation, smuggling, and divulgence of state secrets); Dinmore, Chinese Make Capital
From Their Connections, 2 COMPANY LAW. 86 (1981) (discussing the increase in cases
of bribery and corruption since the open-door policy); Kin Tongwen, Oppose Liberal
Tendencies, Hongqi [in Chinese], Jan. 16, 1981, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Feb. 13,
1981, at L8 (noting that the Party speaks out against liberal tendencies shown by Party
members); Use the Weapon of Law to Crack Down on Criminal Activities, Xinhua [in
Chinese], June 22, 1981, trans. in F.B.I.S.--CHI, June 23, 1981, at K3 (holding the
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fects of these crimes on China's social and economic development, the
Chinese government enacted the Criminal Law Code 6 and Criminal
Procedure Code.17 These codes aid in the ongoing transition from an
imported bourgeois ideology and way of life responsible for the increase in crime): Ev-.
eryone Should Give Publicity To and Help hnplement the Important Resolution to
Defend the Socialist System, Xinhua [in Chinese]. Mar. 9. 1982, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 10, 1982, at K4, KIO [hereinafter 1982 Editorial on Punishing
Criminals] (discussing how the increase in economic crime became a major problem in
China because of its distinct increase in foreign trade since the open-door policy):
Bonavia, Open Door to Disorder?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 29, 1983, at 38 (noting
that high level officials criticized Deng Xiaoping's open-door policy for its direct causa-
tion of crime); Weisskopf, China Stalks Urban Crime, Wash. Post, Aug. 22. 1983. at
A13 (noting that the conservative contingent in Chinese leadership complained about
the corrupting effect of bourgeois decadent influences on socialist idealogy). In 1987,
this conservative contingent curbed many of Deng's reforms. ld.; Drozdiak. Pace of
Reforms Falters in China as Opposition Campaign Advances, Wash. Post, Mar. 8,
1987, at A3 (relating a power struggle in 1987 that challenged Deng's economic re-
forms and ability to rule); Tyson, Beijing Lashes Out at Liberal Intellectuals, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 6, 1989, at 4 (noting that Communist Party General Secretary
Zhao Ziyang condemned liberal intellectuals who advocate a more capitalistic ap-
proach to democracy). The Party issued a circular to officials warning them of social
unrest. Id. Zhao blamed the social unrest on the spreading of the "evils of capitalism."
Id. Zhao associated the social turmoil with concepts of Western democracy instead of
socialist democracy. Id.; see also Fenwick, supra note 10, at 181 (noting modernization
as a variable contributing to the increase in the conventional crime rate since 1976);
Johnson, supra note 14, at 455 (discussing the increase of criminal cases in the 1980s);
Comment, The 1986 Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment in China: Further
Evolution in Chinese Investment Laws, 2 Ar.i. U.J. INT'L L. & PotY 579. 580 n.l
(1987) (discussing the change of power of top Party officials and their internal battle
over economic reform).
16. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XING FA (CRIMINAL LAw CODE OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA), trans. in 25 CHINA, AMERICAN SibRIs OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES (Rothman & Co. 1982) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW CODE] (dividing
the 192 articles of the Chinese Criminal Law Code into two parts: the general provi-
sions, arts. 1-89 and specific provisions, arts. 90-192). The general provisions deal with
the fundamental principles of Chinese criminal law. The specific provisions define
crimes, prescribe their penalties, and set out the range of discretion allowed in sentenc-
ing. Id. Under the general provisions, the definition of crime, id. art. 10. the elements
of foreseeability and negligence in a crime, id. art. 12, as well as criminal punishment,
id. art. 28-32, and its application, id. art. 61, have basically retained their status as
Mao first proposed. Seven distinct categories of crime are enumerated under the spe-
cific provisions. In the forefront are counterrevolutionary crimes. Id. arts. 90-104. This
is followed by crimes endangering the public security. Id. arts. 105-15. Third are the
crimes against the socialist economic order. Id. arts. 116-30. Fourth are the crimes
against citizen's right of person and democratic rights. Id. arts. 131-49. This category
of crime is the only significant divergence from Maoist thought and is a byproduct of
the negative effects and injustices of the Cultural Revolution. The last four crimes are,
encroachment of property, id. arts. 150-56, crimes against the societal management
and order, id. arts. 157-78, crimes against marriage and family, id. arts. 179-84, and
crimes of misconduct in office, id. arts. 185-92. See generally Donovan. supra note I.
at 249-58 (comparing the Chinese Criminal Law Code with the Soviet and several
Western Criminal Law Codes).
17. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGSHII SUSONG FA (CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA), trans. in 26 CHIN.%, AMERICAN
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inefficient state-controlled economy"' to experimentation with a mar-
ket-oriented economy. 9
In addition, the government periodically announced major anticrime
and anticorruption campaigns throughout the 1980s. 20 Government
campaigns imposed significant reforms on a criminal justice system
that had been virtually nonexistent since the Cultural Revolution. 2'
The rapid increase in foreign investment in China, 22 coupled with do-
SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Rothman & Co. 1985) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE] (delineating the Criminal Procedure Code into four parts). Part
one addresses issues such as jurisdiction, defense, evidence, and time periods. Id. Part
two handles the filing of a case and the investigation and initiation of public prosecu-
tion. Id. Part three involves trial procedure. Id. Part four deals with the execution and
enforcement of judgments. Id. The public security organs carry out the investigation
along with the procuratorial organs. Id. art. 3. If the procuratorate determines that
there is sufficient evidence, then it will issue an indictment. Id. art. 100. Thereafter, the
basic, intermediate or higher people's court conducts a trial which is divided into four
stages: investigation, debate, appraisal by the bench, and judgment. Id. part Ill, ch. I
& ch. 11, § I.
Compared to other countries, many differences in Chinese criminal procedure exist,
but they are not examined in this Comment. For a more detailed discussion on Chinese
Criminal Procedure Law, see Shao-Chuan Leng, supra note I, at 214-35 (discussing
pretrial proceedings, right to counsel, presumption of innocence, judicial independence,
equality before the law, and issues of appeal and review); Epp, The New Code of Crim-
inal Procedure in the People's Republic of China: Protection, Problems, and Predic-
tions, 8 INT'L J. COMP. & APP. CRIM. JUST. 43 (1984) (addressing issues and problems
exclusive to Chinese criminal procedure law). Usually, by the time a defendant appears
at trial, the court has already found him or her guilty. Id. at 45. No equivalent U.S.
constitutional fifth amendment right to remain silent exists, and the right to counsel
first attaches at trial level. Id. at 46. No hearsay rule exists and the defendant has a
right to only one appeal. Id. at 49; see also Qiwu Zhu, General Aspects of the Chinese
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 65
(1983) (providing a brief overview of Chinese criminal law and criminal procedure).
18. Jiang Zhenyun, New Constitution Provides Guarantees for Economic Reform,
Jiefang Ribao [in Chinese], Feb. 9, 1983, trans. in JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH
SERVICE: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [hereinafter J.P.R.S.-CHI] No. 83779, June
28, 1983, at 47 (blaming government officials' malfeasance of state management and
administration for crippling the state-run economy).
19. Shao-Chuan Leng, supra note I, at 206.
20. See DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CON-
GRESS REGARDING THE SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS WHO SERIOUSLY SABO-
TAGE THE ECONOMY (adopted Mar. 8, 1982), reprinted in PRC LAWS, 1979-1982,
supra note 8, at 345 (providing an example of one such campaign). In March 1982, the
Standing Committee of the NPC issued a statement recognizing the serious effects that
economic crime had on social and economic development. Id. The Committee identified
crimes such as speculative arbitrage, speculation, extortion, bribery, and embezzlement
and proposed strict measures to punish offenders. Id.; see also infra notes 206-36 and
accompanying text (discussing the anticorruption campaigns from 1979-1988). On Oc-
tober 1, 1988, the Chinese Communist Party, issued a communique imposing signifi-
cant economic reforms to combat the surge of inflation and corruption in China. Id.
21. Peng Zhen, supra note I, at 8 (discussing the first laws to be drafted since
China's shift to socialist modernization in 1979).
22. ZIIONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA) (adopted on Dec. 4, 1982), reprinted in PRC LAWS,
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mestic structural market changes23 such as independent managerial re-
sponsibility,24 collective ownership,25 and the introduction of private en-
terprise,26 have been a significant impetus in China's anticrime
campaigns.
In October 1988 after ten years of unimpeded efforts to replace
China's central economic planning mechanisms with more flexible mar-
ket mechanisms, the Central Committee officially recognized the two
most inherent problems with economic reforms, namely, inflation and
corruption.2 As a result, the Party announced its decision to temper
economic reforms in an attempt to decrease inflation and restrain cor-
ruption. 8 Accordingly, the Party introduced significant reform mea-
1979-82, supra note 8, at 9. The First PRC Constitution was promulgated in 1954 and
was officially revised in 1975, 1978, and 1982. Article 18 provides in whole:
The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign eco-
nomic organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter in
various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises and other Chi-
nese economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People's Republic
of China.
All foreign enterprises, other foreign economic organizations as well as Chi-
nese-foreign joint ventures within Chinese territory shall abide by the law of the
People's Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected by
the law of the People's Republic of China.
Id.
23. Jiang Zhenyun, supra note 18, at 48-50 (discussing the changes in the 1982
PRC Constitution that impact the liberalization of economic reform).
24. Vigorously Promote and Properly Administer Market Trade in Towns and
Countryside, Jingji Ribao [in Chinese], Feb. 24, 1983. trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI No.
83174, Apr. 1, 1983, at 85 [hereinafter Rules of Management and Market Trade]. In
1983. the State Council issued Rules of Management and Market Trade in Towns and
Countryside. Id. These rules are the first to provide legal structure to market trade in
China since 1949. Id. Two important underlying principles of the rules are mutual
competition and joint development. Id. at 86. Before units and individuals may partici-
pate in market trade, however, they must fulfill the state quotas. Id.; see infra notes
184-86 and accompanying text (discussing the economic responsibility system).
25. CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 8 (1982). Article eight pro-
vides encouragement for collective ownership in urban and rural areas. Id. The 1982
Constitution recognized economic collectives in rural areas, yet permitted them to en-
gage in limited aspects of agricultural production for their private use. Id.
26. CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. II (1982). Individual econ-
omy in urban and rural areas is permitted but subject to restrictions. Id. The state has
the duty of protecting the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy as well
as the task of supervising them through administrative control. Id.
27. See Jones, Asia's Success-Stor;y Nations Learning How to Consume, Wall St.
J., Nov. I, 1988, at A24 (reporting China as the only country with moderate inflation-
ary problems in the Asia-Pacific region); Southerland, China Presses New Anticorrup-
tion Drive, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1988, at A26 (naming inflation as one of the causes of
the 1988 anticorruption campaign); China Squeezes Credit. Orders Financial Probe,
Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1988. at A18 (announcing measures to freeze loans for investment
projects not covered by the state plan and to investigate finance companies in an effort
to combat inflation and stabilize prices).
28. See Ignatius, China to Postpone Some Joint Ventures With Foreigners in Bid
1989]
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sures to control corruption, profiteering, and price-gouging.29 These
measures, however, may prove to have an adverse effect on foreign in-
vestment in China by restricting desperately needed capital investment
projects."
China is an important developing country struggling to restructure
its economy from a largely archaic centrally planned system to that of
a market-oriented system. Its efforts are only ten years old. Other de-
veloping socialist countries are focusing their attention on the successes
and failures of China's economic modernization plan.31 Although it is
to Cool Economy, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1988, at All (announcing the cancellation of all
new foreign investment ventures and of some existing joint ventures in an effort to curb
inflation and revitalize the economy); Ignatius, Foreign Firms Learning How to Com-
bat Beijing Bureaucracys Bullying Tactics, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1989, at A12 [herein-
after Ignatius, Beijing Bureaucracy's Bulling Tactics] (noting that the measures im-
posed in October to slow economic growth due to inflation dampened foreign
investment).
29. Ignatius, Beijing Bureaucracy's Bullying Tactics, supra note 28, at A 12.
30. Id.: see Ignatius, Chinese Premier Rules Out Chance of Rapid Reforms, Wall
St. J.. Apr. 4, 1989, at A19 [hereinafter Ignatius, Chinese Premier Rules] (stating that
Chinese Premier Li did not advocate Soviet-like political reforms during the two-year
austerity program that would markedly stifle economic reforms); Gumbel, Moscow
Opens Its Far East to Foreigners, Wall St. J., May 3, 1989, at A14 (describing the
Soviet Union's intent to create a special economic zone modelled after the Hong Kong
and Chinese plans in Vladivostok); Keller, Soviets and China to Renew Normal Ties
After 30 Years: Beijing Pledges Democracy, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1989, at I (discuss-
ing Chinese-Soviet negotiations for more exchange in the areas of political and eco-
nomic reforms); Gumbel, Sino-Soviet Summit Can't Top the Amity Rising on the
Frontier, Wall St. J., May 12, 1989, at Al (quoting Vladimir Ivanov, a leading Mos-
cow-based expert on China as stating that, "China could be the No. I partner for the
Soviet Union"); Gumbel & Ignatius, Moscow and Beijing Sharing the Lessons of Re-
visionism, Wall St. J., May 12, 1989, at A12 (comparing economic statistics of the
Soviet Union and China and discussing the benefit of exchanges in the areas of political
and economic reform): Gumbel & Ignatius, Widening Demonstrations Disrupt His-
toric Chinese-Soviet Meeting, Wall St. J., May 16, 1989, at A I (noting that the Chi-
nese-Soviet Summit marked the restoration of normal relations between both coun-
tries); see also Communism in Turmoil, Bus. WEEK, June 5, 1989. at 34-86
(discussing and comparing recent developments in political and economic reforms in
the Soviet Union and China); Schares, Glasnost's Twin Crucibles, Bus. WEEK, June 5,
1989, at 72 (noting that Poland and Hungary are setting the pace for economic re-
forms by experimenting with free market mechanisms).
31. China and Soviets Ready Venture, Signaling Thaw, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1988,
at A 18 (reporting that the Soviet press praises the Chinese modernization plan and
considers it an economic model). Signals are emerging that the Soviet Union is watch-
ing China's progress carefully to take lessons in economic reform. Id.; Sino-Soviet
Rapprochement Is Restrained, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1988, at AI8 (noting that Moscow
is aggressively pursuing a summit with China); Tyson, Moscow and Beijing: New Lab
Partners in Socialist Experiment, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7, 1989, at I (noting
that the Soviet Union is considering adopting China's economic reforms). Joint studies
on economic reforms have already begun. Id. China noted that a lack of political re-
form has stifled economic reform. Id. at 2. The Chinese are considering adopting a
form of Moscow's glasnost policy to strengthen its political reform. Id.; Gumbel, Soviet
Trade Awaits the Next Revolution, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1989, at A16 (noting that as
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too early to predict how many countries will follow China's lead, it
appears that the trend to liberalize state-controlled economies through
the implementation of market-oriented economic mechanisms will con-
tinue. This comment will analyze how effectively the new Criminal
Law Code controls economic crimes. Its purpose is to identify and ana-
lyze the very serious trend of increasing economic crime that could pre-
sent an earnest threat to ongoing foreign trade. Generally, legal regula-
tion becomes a powerful policing mechanism when a developing
country implements free market measures of economic reform. China,
as a developing communist country, must confront the antagonism of
an internal socialist economic system attempting to merge with foreign
capitalist trade policies.32
Part I of this Comment will discuss the nature of criminal law in
China during the pre-Mao, Mao, and post-Mao periods. Part I1 will
discuss the Party's attempt to curb increased economic crime, focusing
on specific crimes that have resulted from China's shift toward eco-
nomic development. Finally, Part III will evaluate the impact of the
Criminal Law Code on China's new economic policy in both the do-
mestic and international arenas.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. PRIOR TO THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC
In the centuries before Mao Tsetung the Chinese government
achieved social order not through the concept of criminal law, but
rather from the ideology of two opposing schools of thought-the Con-
fucianists and the Legalists.a3 The Confucianists employed the ethical
of April 1, 1989, Soviet companies were scheduled to begin trading directly with for-
eign companies); Seib & Ignatius. U.S.-China-Soviet Links Enter New Phase. Wall St.
J., Feb. 23, 1989, at A12 (noting that the Soviet Union and China are placing empha-
sis on economic cooperation). China needs the Soviet Union to rehabilitate its Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist ideology base among the Chinese people. Id. The Soviets need the Chi-
nese to restructure their internal economy. Id.
32. CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 24 (1982) (requiring the
State to conduct education "among the people in patriotism and collectivism, in inter-
nationalism and communism and in dialectical and historical materialism, to combat
capitalist, feudal and other decadent ideas." (emphasis added)).
33. See MacCormack, Law and Punishment in the Earliest Chinese Thought, 20
IR. JURIST 334 (1985) (discussing the inherent conflicts in the prevalent philosophies
followed in Chinese culture); Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in KAT7Z
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 27-39 (1957) (noting that in period
of economic turmoil li, an ethical concept of virtue and balance, is not influential).
Thus, when li is ineffective,fa is implemented to maintain social order. Id. The mecha-
nism fa employed to maintain social order is penal in nature. ld.: Bodde, Basic Con-
cepts of Chinese Law, in D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 3-1I. 29-
51 (1967) (noting that in premodern China, law wvas penal in nature applied against
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
concept of 1i (virtue and balance) as a means of persuading Chinese
citizens to live moral and crime-free lives.34 As a result of the concept
of li, however, the Chinese nurtured a strong belief in the rules of con-
duct. This belief forced the individual to conform to accepted behavior
because of a moral persuasion rather than a fear of punishment.35 Pun-
ishment under li, therefore, emphasized repentance and rehabilitation
of the offender and not revenge or retribution. 6
Conversely, the Legalists subscribed to the theory of fa, which used
punishment as its tool of control.3 7 Where 1i encouraged harmony in a
nonlitigious atmosphere38 and emphasized virtue within the individ-
ual,3 9 fa used penal and administrative rules, incentives of reward, and
fear to reform men. 40 Ultimately, the Legalist ideology prevailed, re-
sulting in the establishment of fa as law. Thus, law and legal institu-
tions enhanced the power of the state by becoming "weapons of law1'41
and effectively coerced the people to adhere to state policies.42 Al-
though the Party continues to promote the concept offa, its recent ma-
actsdisrupting the social order). The state almost never used the law during this period
to protect the rights of individuals or economic rights. Id.
34. See V. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 13 (1978) (discussing traditional Chinese society's
emphasis on virtue instead of law).
35. Allen, Where Are We Going in Criminal Justice? Some Insights from the Chi-
nese Criminal Justice System, 31 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIM. 101,
103, 107-08 (1987); see MacCormack, supra note 33, at 334 (discussing various an-
cient, historical, and traditional interpretations of the meaning of punishment).
36. Shao-Chuan Leng, Crime and Punishment in Post-Mao China, 2 CHINA L.
REP. 5 (1982); see Johnson, supra note 1I, at 449 (stating that the employed method-
ology of rehabilitation and preventative measures are weakening in the PRC); Qiwu
Zhu, supra note 16, at 68 (addressing the issue of rehabilitation).
37. Bodde, supra note 33, at 6-15 (distinguishing the concepts offa and li).
38. J.A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 66 (1968) [hereinafter COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PRO-
CESS]; see Gelatt, Resurrecting China's Legal Institutions, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 29,
1980, at 4 (noting that the emperor of China issued an edict in 1820 mandating severe
punishment for those in the profession of practicing litigation).
39. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 64.
40. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 67; see China's Socialist Legal System, BEIJING
REV., Jan. 12, 1979, at 25, 30 (stating that law is an essential element in the develop-
ment of productive forces in China and must be drafted and refined to meet that task);
MacCormack, supra note 33, at 42 (revealing that fa has meant "rule established by
Heaven").
4 1. Use the Weapon of Law to Crack Down on Criminal Activities, supra note 15,
at K2 (describing the "weapon of law" as a concept that Mao coined, and it refers to
the law of the country). Under Mao, the meaning of the phrase differed from its cur-
rent use because the laws were subject to arbitrary interpretation. Id. The new admin-
istration retained the phrase. Id. During the anticrime campaign in 1981, the phrase
was used to "strike blows at the enemy, punish offenders, and protect the people." Id.
42. COHEN, The Criminal Process, supra note 38, at 7.
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jor policy changes frustrate the acceptance of the concept of fa as a
guiding philosophy among the Chinese.
B. MAO PERIOD
When the Party, led by Mao Tsetung, wrested control of China from
the Nationalist party in 1949,"3 it adopted a two-tiered system of crimi-
nal justice, which imposed different standards of conduct and levels of
punishment for crimes according to the nature of the crime and the
status of the offender." The first tier focused on serious crimes4
against the state. The second tier focused on less serious offenses.4 6
Corresponding to these qualitative differences, Mao labeled offenders of
43. See M. BLECHER, CHINA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 18-31 (1986)
(discussing the history of the Chinese Revolution). The Party was rounded in 1921. Id.
at 18. Mao became a leader in the Communist movement in 1927. Id. at 19. Mao was
also a great advocate of rectification campaigns to establish social order. Id. at 28. The
essence of the campaigns was to utilize "criticism and self-criticism" rather than puni-
tive action. Id. at 28; J. DOMES, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC: A
TIME OF TRANSITION 68-85 (1985) (discussing the organizational structure and mem-
bership of the Party).
44. See Shao-Chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as
Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung's Influence, 68 Nw. U.J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356
(1977) (discussing Mao's impact on Chinese legal development); see also H. Cut; &
S. LENG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND DOCLNI:NTN 10-28
(1985) (discussing the legal and criminal justice system under Mao).
45. See COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS. supra note 38. at 91 (stating that under
the law of dictatorship, the Party created three categories of criminals: (I) counter-
revolutionaries who acted against the state, including those who engaged in less severe
activities, but were still considered able to undermine the realization of the proletariat
and the socialist good of society; (2) bad elements of society who repeatedly committed
acts affecting an individual; and (3) the people who committed derelictions of duty,
generally limited to one time crimes committed by ordinary people). Counterrevolu-
tionary crimes consisted of such acts as "subversion of the state regime, armed rioting,
organization of secret agents and spies, theft of state military and political secrets and
intelligence, spreading poison, arson, and setting off explosions." Id. The crimes of the
recidivists were hooliganism, rape, stealing, and swindling that coordinated directly
with counterrevolutionary sabotage. Id.; see also infra notes 158-207 (discussing eco-
nomic crimes); CRIMINAL LAW CODE arts. 185-92 (PRC) (listing crimes of dereliction
of duty to include state functionaries engaged in bribery, divulgence of state secrets,
and neglect of duty); Allen, supra note 36, at 106 (illustrating a court trial when a
defendant is punished for dereliction of duty).
46. See COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, at 92 (noting that second-tier offenders
include the crimes of bigamy, mistreatment, interference with the freedom of marriage
of others, infanticide, and crimes arising from traffic and transportation incidents that
cause serious consequences).
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serious crimes "enemies" 47 and offenders of less serious crimes
"people."4 8
1. Dictatorship v. Democracy
To justify its police state, the Party under Mao asserted that China's
previous history of imperialism and bureaucratic exploitation had
"poisoned" the people's consciousness into a feudal and bourgeois ideol-
ogy.419 It used police courts and the weapon of law to combat serious
offenses against the Communist government and punished offenders
with death, imprisonment, or reform through labor.50 During this pe-
riod, the criminal law process served as an "instrument of terror.""'
The police were solely responsible for administering "justice" as they
deemed appropriate.52 Serious crimes were prosecuted by "mass
trial."153 Less serious offenses received informal administrative punish-
47. See id. at 79 (noting that counterrevolutionaries and criminals who committed
crimes that seriously undermined the social order were termed "enemies" and punished
by the imposition of "dictatorship"). The goals for imposing criminal punishment over
administrative sanctions were threefold: punishment and rehabilitation of the offender,
deterrence, and education and inspiration of the citizens to struggle against individuals
prone to crime. Id. at 81.
48. Mao Tsetung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,
in 5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG 391 (1977). All nonenemies were considered
members of the "people" class whose nonrevolutionary offenses were punished by what
the Party referred to as "democracy." Id. This dichotomy is analogous to the United
States criminal law classifications of felony and misdemeanor; see Cohen, Reflections
on the Criminal Process in China, 68 Nw. U.J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 323, 337-39
(1977) [hereinafter Cohen, Reflections on the Criminal Process] (providing discussion
and examples of both the people and enemy classes).
49. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 76-78.
50. Note, Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anticrime Campaign, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1890, 1904 (1985). But see WORK REPORT OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, 5th
NPC, 3rd Sess., (Sept. 2, 1980), trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Sept. 16, 1980, at 41, 42
[hereinafter 1980 REPORT] (noting that the "Gang of Four" greatly exaggerated crimi-
nal activity charges and penalties during the Cultural Revolution). The Party unjustly
charged many Party members and intellectuals with counterrevolutionary crimes. Id.
51. See COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 10 (elaborating on the
police use of violence against reactionaries and bad elements).
52. Id.
53. See Use the Weapon of Law to Crack Down on Criminal Activities, supra note
15, at K2-3 (noting that "mass trial" actually refers to a mass rally where the Party
announces judgment on a criminal case to the public). The purpose of the mass rally is
to provide "wide publicity [of] the legal system, display the might of the people's dem-
ocratic dictatorship, enhance the morale of the masses and strike terror into criminals'
hearts." Id.; Cohen, Reflections of the Criminal Process, supra note 48, at 342-43
(explaining the procedure of mass trials); see also Herbst, Criminal Procedure Under
China's Newest Constitution, Asian Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1983, at 6 (identifying the
problem with mass trial convictions as the very short length of time between arrest,
trial, appeal, and execution). In most capital cases appeal is not allowed. Id. Although
the 1982 Constitution deleted the use of mass trials, the Party, Supreme People's
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ments, such as criticism, fines, brief detentions, or rehabilitation
through labor,54 with no criminal liability.55 Criminal law, as the Chi-
nese learned, was reserved for serious offenses perpetrated by enemies
of the state that were subject to harsher penalties.
2. Legislation for Punishment
The Party devised a system consisting of three legislative acts to en-
force its criminal justice system and punish offenders: the Act of the
PRC for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries (Counterrevolution-
ary Act)," the Act of the PRC for Punishment of Corruption (Corrup-
tion Act),5" and the Security Administration Punishment Act of the
PRC (SAPA).5 8 The Party designed the Counterrevolutionary Act to
Court, and the government still advocate the use of mass trials which still play an
instrumental part in the criminal process. Id.. Supreme Court Issues Circular on Eco-
nomic Crines, Zhonghua Fazhi Bao [Chinese Legal System News]. trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Apr. 5, 1982, at K13 (announcing that the Supreme Court issued a
directive calling for open trials of serious economic crimes).
For examples of mass trials, see Johnson, supra note 1I, at 455 (noting that in Au-
gust 1983, the state executed thirty murderers and rapists after they were displayed in
Beijing's Workers' Stadium before 100,000 people). In October of the same year forty
other convicts were shot in the head after public display. Id.; Ching, China Responds
to Recent Crime Wave With Swift Justice. Longer Jail Terms, Wall St. J., Aug. 4,
1981, at 34. In 1981 over 100,000 people attended mass trials. Id.
54. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL FOR REHABILITATION
THROUGH LABOR, 5th NPC, 12th Sess., (1979). trans. in PRC LAws. 1979-1982,
supra note 8, at 167. Provincial, municipal, and autonomous people's governments ap-
point committees to administer rehabilitation through labor. Id. para. I. The adminis-
trative committees examine and approve those recommended for rehabilitation. Id. at
168-69, para. 2. The people's procuratorates have supervisory authority over the ad-
ministrative committees. Id. at 169, para. 5. The term of rehabilitation is one to three
years. Id. para. 4. Rehabilitation through labor applies only to persons %ho are not
criminally liable. Id. at 169. Examples of these categories are persons engaged in hooli-
ganism, larceny, or fraud and government employees who violate disciplinary rules or
public order. Id. at 168. The administrators mandate measures of education and reform
for the offenders. Id. at 170. The offenders are paid for their work. Id. at 169.
55. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 76-78; see Note, Concepts
of Law in the Chinese Anticrime Campaign, supra note 50, at 1898-1902 (discussing
the dichotomy between law, discipline, and administration).
56. ACT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR PUNISHMENT OF COUNTER-
REVOLUTIONARIES (promulgated on Feb. 21, 1951), reprinted in I ZIIONGHIIA REN.,IIN
ZHENGFU FALING HUIBIAN (COLLECTION OF LAWS AND DECREES OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT) 3, 3-5 (1953) [hereinafter COUNTERREVOLtTION ACT], trans.
in COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 299-302.
57. ACT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR PUNISHMENT OF CORRUPTION
(promulgated on Apr. 21, 1952), reprinted in 3 ZHONGItUA RENMIN ZHiENGFU FAtuNa
HUBIAN (COLLECTION OF LAWS AND DECREES OF THE CIIINESE PEOPLE'S GOVERN-
MENT) 25, 25-28 (1954) [hereinafter CORRUPTION ACT], trans. in COllEN, TIlE CRIMI-
NAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 308-Il.
58. SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND PUNISHMENT ACT (adopted on Oct. 22, 1957),
reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], Feb. 22, 1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Feb. 26,
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suppress counterrevolutionary activity,59 consolidate the people's demo-
cratic dictatorship,6" and punish counterrevolutionary criminals. To
curb public corruption, the Party enacted the Corruption Act.6 The
Party promulgated the SAPA to sanction minor criminal offenses.
The Party weighed the "social danger"62 of a criminal act to assess
the appropriate degree of punishment.6 3 Among the people class, the
Party imposed administrative punishment pursuant to SAPA for rela-
tively minor infractions.6 4 SAPA authorized police, as opposed to
courts, to impose less severe punishment for minor unlawful activities,
such as acts that infringed upon individual interests, violated the mo-
rality of society, or other certain policies, laws, or decrees of state."
SAPA did not impose criminal punishment such as reform through la-
bor (analogous to hard labor camps), imprisonment, or death sentences;
rather, it imposed administrative sanctions, such as nominal fines, three
to ten day detentions, and criticism-education programs.6
1980, at L8 [hereinafter SAPA]. SAPA is still in effect. Id. See generally COHEN, THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 200-37 (discussing SAPA in detail).
59. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 299.
60. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. I (PRC).
61. See COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38, at 308 (listing acts of
corruption). A major focus of the "three-anti movement" was the crusade against cor-
ruption which began in 1952. Id. at 307. Corruption, waste, and bureaucratism com-
prise the "'three evils." Id. at 313. The movement sought to create a more conscientious
bureaucracy and was connected with the "five-anti movement" to obtain complete au-
thority over private business. Id. at 307. The unlawful acts of bribery, tax evasion,
stealing state property, cheating in workmanship and materials, and stealing state eco-
nomic intelligence are known as the "five poisons". Id.
62. See id. at 325-29 (stating that the social danger of an act is the most essential
characteristic of a crime). The three criteria used to measure the degree of social dan-
ger are: (I) the nature of the act; (2) the existence and amount of damage; and (3) the
factors involving the actor's subjective state, primarily whether the actor acted inten-
tionally or negligently, or what his purpose was in committing a certain act. Id. at 330-
32.
63. Id. at 329. In order for a socially dangerous act to be subject to criminal pun-
ishment the actor must have committed the act either intentionally or negligently. Id.
64. See Note, Concept of Law in the Chinese Anticrime Campaign, supra note 50,
at 1898-1901 (noting that administrative sanctions are typically punishments imposed
by the police without the participation of other legal organs such as the procurate and
the courts). The most important types of administrative sanctions are those of rehabili-
tation and punishment imposed under SAPA. Id.
65. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 38 (discussing minor offenses).
66. Id.; see M. BLECHER, supra note 43, at 28 (discussing criticism-education).
Criticism-education occurs when an accused party engages in self-criticism and repen-
tance under the supervision of court officials. Id. The courts employ various methods
such as the admission of guilt to the community and work unit in which the accused
lives and/or hours of repetitive writing admitting guilt, weakness, and promise to re-
form. Id.
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C. POST-MAO PERIOD
The Party's thirty-year lapse in the codification of the criminal law
can be attributed to Mao's bias against bureaucratization and his cor-
responding preference for the "mass line."167 It also reflected the Party's
historical emphasis on the societal, as opposed to the jural, model of
law. 8 This societal approach, however, provided the Chinese people
with virtually no understanding of, or experience with, the legal
system.69
In 1975, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the Party.70 Through
slow and arduous efforts, the Party attempted to promote and integrate
the role of law and justice into Chinese society. 1 In 1978, China em-
barked on a plan to spur economic growth, known as the open-door
policy. 2 The open-door policy simultaneously placed greater reliance
on market forces and curbed government controls by encouraging pri-
vate enterprise and individual initiative. 3 To implement this policy the
Chinese government developed a series of structural economic reforms,
dubbed the four modernizations,7 4 and price reform .7  Although the
67. See H. CHIU & S. LENG, supra note 44, at 24-26 (discussing the theory behind
the mass line); Epp, supra note 17, at 43 (noting that the true cause of the nonexis-
tence of a criminal code may be attributed to the period of laxlessness during the
Cultural Revolution).
68. Shua-Chuan Leng, supra note i, at 205.
69. Han, Strengthening the Legal System Is the Safeguardfor Developing Democ-
racy, Renmin Ribao [in Chinese]. Feb. 3, 1981, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI. Feb. 13.
198 1. at L8.
70. See supra note 12 (discussing Deng Xiaoping's accession to Part) leadership).
71. See H. CHiu & S. LENG, supra note 44, at 35-121 (discussing the role of law
and the legal system under Deng).
72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the open-door policy).
73. See Chao & Xiaping, Private Enterprise in China: The Developing Law of
Collective Enterprises, 19 INT'L LAW. 1215, 1217-18 (1985) (discussing collective en-
terprises since 1978); Hudspeth, The Nature and Protection of Economic Interests in
the People's Republic of China, 46 ALB. L. REv. 691 (1982) (discussing various forms
of enterprises in China); Niang, China: Corruption and Economic Crime. 7 CoM*IPA Y
LAW. 81, 81-82 (1986) (discussing problems of corruption and other economic crimes
in private enterprises); Tung, Preface: Reforms of the Economic and Management
Systems in China, 12 INT'L STUD. MAN & ORG. 8 (1982) (discussing the granting of
greater autonomy for enterprises); Comment, The Role of the Black Market in
China's International Finance System, 7 Nw. U.J. INT'L L. & Bts. 833. 845-847(1986) (discussing the government's tacit acceptance of the black market's operation);
see also XUE MUQUIAO, supra note 3, at 25-32 (discussing the socialist transformation
of private enterprise and capitalist industry).
74. See SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING. 1975-1982 145-50 (1984) (ad-
dressing the role of the Chinese people in the four modernization's program); see also
supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the four modernization's
program).
75. See Lubman, Policy and Administration Unclear in China's Laws, Asian Wall
St. J., Nov. 18, 1980, at 6, (noting that in 1980 the Chinese government launched
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four modernizations and the open-door policy increased international
trade and investment, it also resulted in a surge of economic crime.7
In response to the increase in economic crimes, the Party enacted the
Criminal Law Code and the Criminal Procedure Code in 1980 as two
measures to promote foreign trade and deter domestic criminal activ-
ity.7 7 Through the enactment of the Codes, the Party intended to rem-
edy the erosion of the legal system during the Cultural Revolution,
when sham courts convicted innocent people of political transgres-
sions.78 Thus, Chinese criminal law began to evolve from a tool under
Mao that supported class struggle7 9 to an instrument under Deng
Xiaoping that enhances economic modernization.8"
1. The Criminal Law Code and the Criminal Procedure Code
Notwithstanding the Criminal Law Code's and Criminal Procedure
reforms to bring greater autonomy to enterprises and localities). The government also
experimented with its first price reforms. Id.; see also The Provisional Regulations
Governing Price Control, Xinhua [in Chinese], Aug. 22, 1982, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Aug. 25, 1982, at K7 (finding that the State Council adopted three
different price reforms: prices fixed by the state, prices fixed by the enterprise that are
regulated by state agencies, and trade fair prices). State-fixed prices were the principal
form. Id.
76. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in economic
crime); Bennett, Executions on Rise as China Battles Crime, Asian Wall St. J., Aug.
24, 1983, at 2 (noting that certain Chinese officials link the tremendous increase in
economic crime to relaxation of economic controls and the importation of Western in-
fluence); see also Reuter, Press Warns of Danger to Reforms, South China Morning
Post, June 10, 1988, at 8 (quoting various Chinese newspapers denouncing the import
of Western-style individualism).
77. Foster, Codification in Post-Mao China, 30 AM. J. ComP. L. 395, 410 (1982).
78. See 1980 REPORT, supra note 50, at 43 (stating that the "Gang of Four...
decided the nature of a case first, looked for data, willfully cooked up charges, and
vigorously obtained confessions by compulsion and then gave them credence"). During
the Cultural Revolution, all levels of the People's Courts were "smashed." Id. During
this period, the amount and level of criminal activity is difficult to ascertain because
the court system was in disarray. Id. The use of investigative methods and evidence was
completely arbitrary. Id.; see also Peng Zhen, supra note I, at 8 (stating that more
than thirty drafts on the Criminal Law Code existed before the Cultural Revolution).
The 33rd and final draft was put into force beginning on January I, 1980. Id.
79. See XuE MUQIAO, supra note 3, at 267-88 (discussing class struggle and con-
tradictions among the Chinese people under the rule of Mao Tsetung).
80. See COMMUNIQUE OF THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE I ITH CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, Beijing Rev., Dec. 29, 1978, at 6,
10-I1 (observing that the official focus is shifting from class struggle to economic mod-
ernization); Ching, Chinese Communist Party's New Charter Puts Economic Goals
Above Class Struggle, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1982, at 30 (noting the 1982 Chinese Com-
munist Party Constitution stated that "[tihe principal contradiction in Chinese society
is that between the people's growing material and cultural needs and the backward
level of our social production"); see also Foster, supra note 77, at 410 (arguing that
one of the main functions of codes is to advance foreign economic relations).
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Code's emphasis on economic modernization, their foundations are still
derived from the Maoist concepts of counterrevolutionary crimes 8' and
crimes of corruption.82 The categories of criminal perpetrators under
Mao, however, have changed.83 Before 1978, Mao categorized
criminals who committed acts against the state as belonging to the en-
emy class and as the "dregs of society.?' 4 Since 1978, however, the
Supreme People's Court classifies the majority of criminals as "working
people."8' 5
Four of the eight chapters of the Criminal Law Code discuss eco-
nomic crimes. Chapter three, entitled Crimes of Undermining the So-
cialist Economic Order, addresses crimes such as speculation,8 smug-
gling,87 counterfeiting,88 and tax evasion.8 9 Embezzlement 0 and
81. See CRIMINAL LAW CODE arts. 90-104 (PRC) tdefining counterrevolutionary
crimes); Popularization and Propaganda Lecture (No. 32) on PRC Criminal Law.
What is a Counterrevolutionar Crime?. Renmin Ribao [in Chinese], May 2. 1983,
trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, May 5, 1983, at K8 (defining counterrevolutionary crime as
requiring motive and purpose to overthrow the people's democratic dictatorship and the
socialist system); REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, 6th NPC,
1st Sess., (June 7, 1983). trans. in F.E.-CHI No. 7372, at C3 [hereinafter 1983 RE-
PORT] (noting that counterrevolutionary crimes made up only 0.5% of all crimes in
1982).
82. CRIMINAL LAW CODE arts. 116-30 (PRC) (defining crimes %%hich "undermine
the socialist economic order").
83. 1983 REPORT, supra note 81. at C3.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. CRIMINAL LAW CODE arts. 117-19 (PRC). It is a crime to speculate on the
regulated areas of monetary affairs, foreign exchange, gold and silver, or the adminis-
tration of industrial and commercial affairs. Id. art. 117.
Those involved in cases of smuggling and/or speculation on a regular basis are sub-
ject to a harsher sentence of three to ten years. Id. art. 118 (amended 1982). The 1982
amendment changes the minimum penalty to ten years and the maximum penalty to
life imprisonment or death. RESOLUTION FOR SEVERELY PUNISIHING OFFEDERS WIIO
Do GREAT DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY, 5th NPC, 22nd Sess., (adopted Mar. 8. 1982)
(effective Apr. 1, 1982), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese]. Mar. 9. 1982, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 10, 1982, at KI [hereinafter 1982 RESOLLTIoN O\ ECOmOMiC
CRIMES].
State functionaries involved in the crimes of smuggling or speculation are subjected
to heavier punishment which is not specified in the Code. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art.
119 (amended 1982) (PRC). The amendment defines severe punishment for a state
functionary as a minimum penalty of ten years with a maximum of life imprisonment
or death. Id.
87. CRIMINAL LAW CODE arts. 116, 118-19 (PRC). It is illegal to engage in smug-
gling in violation of the customs law. Id. art. 116.
88. Id. arts. 120, 122-24. It is illegal to counterfeit or resell ration coupons for the
purpose of profit, id. art. 120; to counterfeit or traffic in counterfeited national cur-
rency, id. art. 122; to counterfeit checks, share certificates, or other valuable securities,
id. art. 123; to counterfeit tickets for transportation. postage stamps. tax stamps or
invoices for profit, id. art. 124.
89. Id. art. 121. Persons evading or refusing to pay taxes in violation of the tax law
and regulations commit a crime. Id.
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extortion,91 considered to be crimes of property, are addressed in chap-
ter five. Chapter six concerns crimes of obstructing the administration
of public order, including such acts as forging, altering, stealing, or
destroying official documents,92 certificates or seals of state organs, en-
terprises, institutions, or people's organizations.93 Finally, chapter eight
covers crimes of dereliction of duty, primarily by state functionaries,
making it illegal to accept or offer bribes, 94 divulge state secrets,90 and
neglect official duties.96
The Criminal Law Code and Criminal Procedure Code proved inade-
quate at the outset. Ineffectual results arose from ambiguities in the
Criminal Law Code concerning the definition of crimes of embezzle-
ment, speculation, and bribery. In response, the Supreme People's
Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a joint circular defin-
ing acts and elements necessary to constitute an economic crime.9 In
90. Id. art. 155 (amended 1982). It is a crime to exploit a government position to
embezzle public property. Id. Plundering "industrial or mining enterprises, banks,
shops, warehouses, or other articles of public property" is also a counterrevolutionary
crime. Id. art. 100(2).
91. Id. art. 154. Extortion of money or other public or private property by black-
mail is a crime. Id.
92. Id. art. 100(2). Stealing state records is also a counterrevolutionary crime. Id.
93. Id. art. 167. Forgery or illegal use of state documents, seals, or certificates is a
crime. Id.; see 15 Major Economic Swindling Cases Unearthed in Shenzhen Last Year,
Ta Kung Pao [in Chinese] Jan. 15, 1986, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Jan. 17, 1986, at
W3 (stating that the official Chinese seal of a company, also known as a chop, makes
the contract binding).
94. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. 185 (amended 1982) (PRC). State functionaries
who accept bribes shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five
years or criminal detention. Id. The funds or articles received as bribes shall be confis-
cated, and public funds or articles shall be recovered. Id. More serious losses carry a
sentence of fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years. Id. Those offering or
introducing bribes to state functionaries are subject to up to three years fixed-term
imprisonment or criminal detention. Id. Under the amendment, state functionaries will
be punished for bribery under article 155, and in serious cases, will receive life impris-
onment or death. Id.
95. Id. art. 186. State functionaries who divulge important state secrets, in viola-
tion of state laws and regulations on the protection of secrets, are sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than seven years, criminal detention, or deprivation of
political rights. Id. If a person who is not a state functionary commits the crime men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph, he shall be punished in light of the circumstances
and in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph. Id.
96. Id. art. 187 (amended 1982). State functionaries who neglectfully cause public
property or the interests of the state and the people to suffer heavy losses are sentenced
to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention. Id. The
amendment calls for a minimum ten'year penalty and a maximum penalty of life im-
prisonment or the death penalty. Id.; see Heighten Our Vigilance and Strengthening
the Work of Keeping Things Secret, Renmin Ribao, Apr. 1I, 1980, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Apr. 11, 1980, at L8-9, LII [hereinafter Heighten Our Vigilance]
(stating that a form of negligence is found in not guarding party and state secrets).
97. Document Clarifies Bribery Law, China Daily, Aug. 3, 1985, at 4.
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addition, in reaction to a surge of criminal activity in 1981, the amend-
ment, entitled Decision on the Question of Approval of the Death Sen-
tence, imposed harsher sentences, including the death sentence, on
criminal activity. 8
Similarly, in 1982, to combat the increase in corrupt activity, the
National People's Congress (NPC) amended the Criminal Law Code
by adopting two resolutions, the 1982 Resolution on Economic Crimes
and the Resolution on Severely Punishing Criminals Who Gravely En-
danger Public Security. 9 These resolutions substantially increased
criminal penalties for economic crimes. For example, whereas the max-
imum penalty for those convicted of committing economic crimes was a
sentence of ten years, the new resolutions set the minimum penalty for
economic crimes at ten years with a maximum of life imprisonment or
even death for serious crimes of corruption.100 In contrast, the NPC
98. See DECISION ON THE QUESTION OF APPROVAL OF THE DEATII SENTENCE
(adopted on June 10, 1981), reprinted in Renmin Ribao. June 1. 1981. at I. trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, June 11, 1981, at K4 [hereinafter DEATH SENTENCE DECISION) (stat-
ing that the Decision amended articles 144 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code).
Prior to 1981, the Criminal Procedure Code required the Supreme People's Court to
approve the death sentence. Id. The crimes that no longer needed Supreme Court ap-
proval from 1981 through 1983 were murder, robbery, rape or arson, the use of explo-
sives or poisons, and tampering with means of transportation or electrical equipment.
Id.; REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, 5th NPC. 4th Sess..
(Dec. 7, 1981), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], Dec. 15, 1981. trans. in
F.B..S.-CHI, Dec. 21, 1981, at KI [hereinafter 1981 REPORT] (noting that from
October 1980 through September 1981, 39,000 cases of the above criminal offenses
were tried and punished). Wang Hanbin on Law Revisions, Xinhua [in Chinese]. Sept.
2, 1983, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Sept. 6, 1983, at K13 (clarifying the reasons behind
the Death Sentence Decision). Wang Hanbin was Secretary General of the NPC
Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the
NPC Standing Committee. Id. One of the main reasons behind the Death Sentence
Decision was the rapid increase in crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery which
imperiled the security of Chinese society and threatened the public order. Id. The Deci-
sion was important because it directly allowed higher peoples courts of provinces, mu-
nicipalities, and autonomous regions to impose the death penalty without prior approval
of the Supreme People's Court. Id. But see Jochnowitz, Punishment Chinese-style:
[B/eware Isic] the [Rled [Check [Af/ark, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, June 25. 1986.
at 14 (estimating that China has executed over 20,000 people for crimes since 1983).
The author argues that the death sentence for economic crimes is too severe. Id.
99. 1982 RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC CRIMES. supra note 86, at KI. RESOLLTION
ON SEVERELY PUNISHING CRIMINALS WiO GRAVELY ENDANGER PUBLIC SECURITY,
6th NPC, 2d Sess., (Sept. 2, 1983), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese]. Sept. 2, 1983,
trans. in F.B.I.S.-CH1, Sept. 6. 1983, at K2 [hereinafter 1983 RESOLLTION O% Eco-
NOMIC CRIMES ENDANGERING PUBLIC SECURIM ].
100. See 1981 REPORT, supra note 98 (noting that crimes of corruption %%ere spe-
cifically mentioned in the 1981 temporary revision, but remained subject to approval):
Wren, Crime and Capital Punishment in China. N.Y. Times.. Nov. 20. 1983. at E9
(discussing the use of capital punishment in the anticrime campaign). Embezzlers are
also subject to the death penalty. Id. Chinese tradition emphasizes society over the
individual: thus, Chinese are not disturbed by the death penalty. Id. Western sources
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utilized an amnesty program and granted lighter sentences to criminals
who surrendered themselves to the police by May 1, 1982, prior to the
imposition of the new regulations.101 To punctuate the Party's zeal to
strengthen criminal penalties, in 1986 it applied the amended death
penalty sentence to Party members and their children who engaged in
illegal activities for private gain.'
These laws and statutory changes created a legal foundation for in-
creased control of economic crime, albeit an unsettled foundation. For
example, when the Party made the statutory changes in sanctioning
and sentencing, it failed to specify'the illegal act constituting a crime
or a minor infraction of social order. To refine the law, the Party for-
mulated policies through Maoist-type anticorruption campaigns. 0 3 The
policies of these political campaigns determined the degree of severity
of the crimes and the level of punishment.104 Inherent conflicts between
the Criminal Law Code and the anticorruption campaigns, however,
surfaced in the areas of implementation and enforcement due to the
absence of a legal system.
estimate over 5,000 executions in 1983. Id; see also Herbst, A Legal Opinion, CHINA
TRADE REP., Dec. 1983, at 13 (warning of the emphasis placed on laws and the legal
system in light of the true lawmakers-the Party). Although the courts approve the
death sentence, the Party is the true driving force behind capital punishment and the
execution of over 5,000 persons in 1983. Id.
101. See 1982 RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC CRIMES, supra note 87, at K2 (revealing
the new regulations); REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SUPRENME PEOPLE'S
PROCURATORATES, 5th NPC, 5th Sess. (Dec. 6, 1982), reprinted in Renmin Ribao [in
Chinese], Dec. 17, 1982, at I, 3, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Dec. 23, 1982, at K21, K22[hereinafter 1982 CHIEF PROCURATOR REPORT] (stating that 44,874 people voluntarily
admitted to committing economic crimes); see infra notes 104-10 and accompanying
text (discussing the 1982 anticrime campaign and NPC resolutions).
102. Southerland, China Warns on Economic Crime, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1986, at
A12. The state extended the death penalty to high officials shortly after a reignited
anticorruption campaign. Id. The effect was to signal the gravity of corruption by
"'kill[ing] one to warn a hundred.'" Id.; see Hong, supra note 6, at 86-89 (blaming
Deng's organizational approach for the corruption of high-ranking officials and their
children). A new elite has emerged out of the period of modernization. Id. at 87; Eco-
nomic Criminals Executed in China, J. Commerce, Jan. 24, 1986, at 5A (reporting the
first executions of economic criminals after senior authorities officially applied the pen-
alty to government officials). In January 1989, in Shanghai 10,000 people attended a
mass trial of 30 criminals convicted of perpetrating an economic crime. Id. Two re-
ceived a death sentence and the others received heavy prison terms. Id. The Shanghai
court sentenced one person for embezzling "important industrial materials" without
defining important. Id. The other was sentenced for swindling $30,000 while misrepre-
senting himself as an overseas Chinese businessman. Id.
103. See infra notes 206-36 and accompanying text (discussing anticorruption
campaigns).
104. See Note, Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anticrime Campaign, supra note
50, at 1902 (discussing law versus policy in the PRC).
[VOL. 5:161
ECONOMIC CRIMES IN THE PRC
2. Monitoring and Enforcement
From 1954 until 1980, Party committees tried cases and rendered
decisions. 0 5 In 1980, the Supreme People's Court issued a report abol-
ishing this practice.106 During the Cultural Revolution, state enterprises
became disorganized.10 7 As a result, the Chinese people took an active
role in the detection and reporting of illegal activities by writing letters
to the Supreme People's Procuratorate'0 8 or making phone calls to cor-
ruption hotlines. 09 In 1979, the central role of the Party in monitoring
crime and enforcing criminal sanctions weakened as the Party ap-
pointed various agencies and created several systems to monitor and
enforce criminal activity, specifically economic criminal activity.110 The
105. Supreme Court President Discusses Legal S)ysten Reform, XINHUA [in Chi-
nese], Aug. 25, 1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Aug. 27, 1980, at L7.
106. See id. at L7 (stating that in a report given at a Beijing Municipal Conference
on judicial work for criminal law and Criminal Procedure Code law, Jiang Hua called
for the abolition of Party committees' practice of trying and rendering decisions on
criminal cases); Haocheng, Party Committee Could Not Continue Examining and Ap-
proving Cases, Beijing Ribao [in Chinese], Jan. 23, 1981, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI,
Feb. 2, 1981, at L8, L9 (stating that public committees should lose their po%%er to
examine and approve cases).
107. See Cronin, The Changing Face of Justice, U.S.-CHtNA REv.. May-June
1980, at 12-13 (noting the assets of state organizations and collectives %%ere not ade-
quately protected and monitored). Signed contracts were not legally binding. Id.
108. See id. at 12 (noting the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the highest organ of
legal supervision in China, received over 15,000 letters monthly divulging wrongful or
illegal activities).
109. China Introduces Reporting Centers. Guidelines on Corruption. CIINA IN-
FORMATICS. Aug. 18, 1988, at 293 (announcing that the Ministry of Supervision
(MOS) set up corruption reporting centers). The MOS provides a phone number
(#2025391) on a 24-hour basis for Chinese and foreigners wishing to report suspicions
of graft, bribery, blackmail, extortion, or any other illegal activities committed by gov-
ernment officials. Id. The report also provides guidelines on when a government official
may collect commissions or receive bonuses. Id. at 12-13.
110. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAYUAN ZU7III FA (Tile ORGANIC
LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC oF CHINA) (promulgated
on July 5, 1979, and effective on Jan. I, 1980), reprinted in Xinhua. July 5, 1979,
trans. in Organic Law for People's Courts, F.B.I.S.-CHI, July 20. 1979. at supp. 20
[hereinafter ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS] (stating that the court system is
responsible for the trial and sentencing of criminals): ZIIO\GIIUA RE%:MIN
GONGHEGUO RENMIN JIANCHAYUAN ZUZHI FA (TiE ORGANIC LAW OF TIll, PEOPLE'S
PROCURATORATES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA) (promulgated on July 5,
1979, and effective as of Jan. 1, 1980), reprinted in Xinhua, July 5, 1979. trans. in
Organic Lawfor People's Procuratorates, F.B.I.S.-CHI. July 27, 1979. at supp. 27
[hereinafter ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES] (dictating the procu-
ratory system's importance). The procuratory system is responsible for investigating
criminal cases, supervising and monitoring the police, initiating prosecutions, revie%%ing
trial procedures, carrying out judgments, and operating correctional facilities. ld.: Silk.
Economic Crime in China, CHINA Bus. RE%,. Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 25 (discussing the
major economic crimes and outlining the organizations which monitor and enforce eco-
nomic crimes). For example, the public security apparatus is responsible for the uncov-
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establishment of these new agencies has prompted an effort to create
links between law and policy, a difficult feat considering the immense
power given to Party committees.'
In a further effort to balance the power between the Party and the
judiciary, the revised 1982 Constitution provides for independent judi-
cial power."' In reality, however, the judicial branch exercises very lit-
tle independent initiative because it is obligated to follow the Party's
directives, issued through anticrime and anticorruption campaigns.
Thus, the provision granting independent judicial power remains one of
form and little substance." 3
3. The Role of Lawyers in the Legal System
Economic modernization and the subsequent development of the so-
ering and investigating crimes. Id. at 28. Public security officers also impose adminis-
trative sanctions. Id. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce is
responsible for uncovering individuals and enterprises earning illegal profits from busi-
ness transactions. Id. The China Audit Administration was created in September 1983
to monitor state tax collection and audit the finances of Chinese enterprises and units
and their use of state funds. Minister on Combatting Corruption, Xinhua [in Chinese],
Aug. 21, 1987, reprinted in F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 163, Aug. 24, 1987, at 13.
See New Ministry Fights Corruption, 39 BEIJING REv., Sept. 28, 1987, at 8 (dis-
cussing the creation of the MOS in 1987 to combat corruption, bribery, and malfea-
sance of government employees). The MOS supervises the performance of government
departments, government workers, and government-employed factory managers, Id. It
also supervises contracts signed with foreigners and monitors the economic information
revealed to foreigners to prevent the divulgence of state secrets. Id. The MOS is cur-
rently drafting a series of regulations concerning government officials, declaration of
their income, citizen's rights to inform against state functionaries, and punishments for
officials involved in corruption, bribery, and dereliction of duty. ld.' China Introduces
Reporting Centers, Guidelines on Corruption, supra note 109, at 293 (reporting that
the MOS set up Corruption Reporting Centers). The Centers aid individuals in report-
ing acts of corruption in state and Party-run departments. Id. In August 1988, a cor-
ruption hotline was introduced to crack down on corruption. Id.
I ll. Supreme Court President Discusses Legal System Reform, Xinhua, [in Chi-
nese], Aug. 25, 1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Aug. 27, 1980, at L7. In 1980, the
Supreme People's Court issued a report to abolish this practice of Party Committees
trying cases and rendering decisions. Id.; see State Handles Over 2 Million Economic
Violations, Xinhua [in Chinese] Oct. 22, 1986, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Oct. 27, 1986,
at K13 (noting that from 1984 to 1986, the Industry and Commerce Administration
Department investigated and reported 2.09 million cases of speculation, manufacture
and marketing of counterfeit commodities, and smuggling). This Department is an ad-
ministrative body and any economic infractions are subject to penalties under SAPA.
Id.
112. CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 126 (1982) (providing in-
dependent judicial power to the people's courts without state or individual
interference).
113. See Lubman, China Lays Down the Law as Legal System Modernized,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 10, 1983, at I I (stating that the courts in effect have
little autonomy); Herbst, supra note 53, at 6 (noting skepticism in the independent role
awarded the courts under the 1982 Constitution).
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cialist legal system" ' brought an increase in the importance of law-
yers," 5 a class the Party had castigated during the Cultural Revolu-
tion." 6 In an effort to give the legal system credibility, the Party
promoted the legal profession by making public statements urging its
reestablishment." 7 To acheive this goal, in 1982 the Party promulgated
the Regulations on Lawyers,"1 8 strengthening the legal system then
composed of the people's courts,1 9 the prosecutorial organs, 2 and the
public security (police) system.1 21
The new role assigned to lawyers, however, is confined to legal issues
arising from foreign investment. Their role in the criminal justice sys-
tem remains restricted. The NPC placed great emphasis on training
114. Peng Zhen, Report on the Work of the NPC Standing Committee, BEIJING
REV., Sept. 29, 1980, at 23, 25; see Pitney, The Role of Legal Practitioners in the
People's Republic of China, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 323. 324 (1988) [hereinafter Legal
Practitioners] (providing an extensive analysis of the legal profession since 1978).
115. See Schatz & Silkenat, Signals from China's Legal System, NAT'L L.J.. Feb.
18, 1980, at 35 (stating that those responsible for the implementation of the moderni-
zation policy seek reliance on laws to protect them from radical political shifts).
116. Gellhorn, China's Quest for Legal Modernity, I J. CHINESE L. 7 (1987); see
Gelatt, Resurrecting China's Legal Institutions, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 29. 1980. at 4
(stating that until 1957 there were approximately 3,000 lawyers practicing in China).
With the onset of the "anti-rightist" movement in 1957 came the demise of the legal
profession. Id. Most lawyers were sent to labor camps. ld.; Yu Xiangyang. Discussing
the Lawyer System, Dazhong Ribao [in Chinese]. Sept. 3, 1980. trans. in
J.P.R.S.-CHI No. 76910, Dec. 1, 1980, at 65 (observing that the "Gang of Four"
delivered the final blow to the legal system when it eliminated the public security or-
gans, the procuratorial organs, and the people's courts); see also Vice Minister Wang
[of Ministry of Justice] Notes Shortage of Lawyers, Xinhua [in Chinese]. Oct. 29,
1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Oct. 30, 1980, at LI (stating that in 1980 China had
only 2,000 lawyers). The goal of the Ministry of Justice was to have one lawyer per
every 10,000 city dwellers and 50,000 peasants by 1985. ld.; The Role of Lawyers,
BEIJING REV., Feb. 15, 1982, at 9 (noting that by 1982, China had 5,500 full-time and
1,300 part-time lawyers).
117. REPORT OF THE WORK OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCLRATORTE. 5th
NPC, 3rd Sess., (Sept. 2, 1980), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese]. Sept. 16, 1980.
trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, at 44, 45 [hereinafter 1980 CHIEF PROCIRATOR REPORT]
(emphasizing the need for a stronger legal system); see H. CmitU & S. LENG. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA 47, 69-71 (1985) (discussing the role of criminal justice
and criminal procedure).
118. ZHONGHUA RENIiN GONGHEGUO LUSHI ZHANXING TIAOYE (PROVISIONAL
REGULATIONS ON LAWYER'S OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CIHINA) art. 13 (adopted
on Aug. 26, 1980, and effective on Jan. I, 1982), trans, in China Reconstructs Her
Legal System, 9 INT'L Bus. L. 255 (1981) [hereinafter PRACTITIONERS' REGLLA-
TIONS]. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for overseeing the "lawyer's system." Id.
art. 13; see Gelatt, Legal Profession and Lanyers Start to Reemerge in China, Asian
Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1980, at 4 (discussing the importance and purpose of the adopted
1980 Provisional Regulations for Lawyers in the PRC).
119. ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS. supra note 110, at supp. 20.
120. ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES, supra note 110. at supp.
27.
121. Legal Practitioners, supra note 114, at 325.
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
lawyers to practice in the field of business, particularly with respect to
foreign investment. 2 ' According to the Chinese government, the role of
the lawyer is to promote corporate profitability 12 3 and economic re-
forms.124 In civil cases or disputes,2 5 lawyers are responsible for draft-
ing factory regulations, detecting problems in poorly drafted contracts,
eliminating the effects of management deficiencies, exposing white-col-
lar crime, and avoiding inequities in contract negotiations. 2 6 Lawyers
in China are also being trained to practice dispute resolution, legal in-
terpretation of documents, and business planning.' 27
Conversely, lawyers maintain a relatively weak role in the criminal
system, limited to representing the interests of the state 2 a as opposed
to representing the accused. 2 9 When a lawyer is involved in a criminal
trial, his or her sole function is to argue for mitigation of the offender's
sentence; guilt is usually determined before the trial begins.' 30 More-
over, in the field of criminal law, police and courts still view lawyers
with hostility 31-a hostility that is embedded in historical prejudices
and which is likely to increase as more people are prosecuted for eco-
nomic crimes. 131
122. Id. at 357-62.
123. Id. at 324. In 1988, more than 40,000 corporations had legal counsel. Id.
124. See id. at 324 (noting the role of lawyers is not, as in most Western countries,
to safeguard the rights of the individual or to help maintain public order). The an-
ticrime campaign in the early 1980s accelerated the hearing of criminals, thereby
usurping control from the attorney. Id. at 386.
125. See 1981 REPORT, supra note 98, at K4 (stating that by 1981, economic
courts had been established at all higher people's courts and at 293 intermediate courts
to handle economic disputes). In the same year, 14,600 economic cases were tried. Id.
126. Legal Practitioners, supra note 114, at 367.
127. Id. at 369; see Yu Xiangyang, supra note 116, at 66 (emphasizing the major
role of lawyers in settling economic disputes).
128. PRACTITIONERS' REGULATIONS, supra note 118, art. I. "A Lawyer is the na-
tion's legal practitioner .... " Id. at 255.
129. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 27 (PRC). Article 27 does not mandate the
courts to appoint a defender. Id. With the absence of the right to counsel, the provision
that the court must notify a defender no later than three days before trial severely
hampers the attorney's ability to represent the defendant or accused. Id. art. 110. The
problem is compounded further by the Public Security officials' right to incarcerate a
suspect without formal arrest for up to a two month period before deciding whether to
try the case. Id. art. 92.
130. Legal Practitioners, supra note 114, at 365; Schatz & Silkenat, supra note
115, at 13 (noting that if the defendant does not admit guilt, then the defense counsel
is required to persuade him or her to do so). Immediate admission of guilt eliminates
the need for a fact-finding process, thereby hindering the determination of the source of
an economic crime. Id. The sources include financial status and market influences and
pressures on the individual. Id.
131. Legal Practitioners, supra note 114, at 346-47.
132. Id. at 347. Moreover, the very system that the Chinese people already distrust
is creating more opportunity for crime, while neglecting the Chinese institutions cre-
ated to protect socialist ideology from bourgeois influence. Id.
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11. ECONOMIC CRIMES
A. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF ECONOMIC CRIMES-SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES
After launching the open-door policy in 1978, the Chinese govern-
ment began to implement a plan that involved choosing certain regions
in China as Special Economic Zones (SEZs or zones) for fostering for-
eign investment. On May 16, 1980, the government officially created
four such zones.13 3 The regions are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou of
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of Fujian Province. Hainan Island
became the fifth SEZ in 1987.3
As the Chinese government created the SEZ, officials in Guangdong
Province, where three of the five zones are located, simultaneously re-
ported a surge of economic criminal activity. 3 The anticorruption
campaigns did not curb economic criminal activity; instead, crimes
133. Zheng, Law and Policy of China's Special Economic Zones and Coastal Cit-
ies, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMip. L. 193, 196 (1987) [hereinafter Zheng. China s
SEZs] (providing a detailed legal analysis of the SEZ, Economic and Technological
Development Zones (ETDZ), and "open regions" in the PRC).
134. Id. In an effort to relax further the restrictions on economic expansion, the
Chinese government broadened the regulations for existing SEZs and created ETDZs
in major coastal cities. Id. at 197. Thirteen ETDZs exist as of mid-1987. Id. The
ETDZs were established mainly to reduce restrictions and regulator) control over for-
eign trade. Id. at 197. Most ETDZs have their own laws and regulations like the SEZs.
Id. at 262-65. The SEZs and ETDZ created market-oriented economic areas %ith the
fundamental goal of attracting foreign investment. Id. at 199-262 (discussing the char-
acteristics of SEZs and their legal structure). The status of preferential treatment is
the main difference between the SEZs and ETDZs. Id. SEZs enjoy preferential treat-
ment for both the service and industrial sectors while ETDZs receive preferential treat-
ment only for enterprises involving industrial growth. Id. at 263.
Beginning in 1984, the Chinese government granted thirteen coastal cities preferen-
tial treatment for foreign investments. Zheng, supra note 133, at 276-79. The) are
Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao. Lianyungang. Nantong. Shanghai.
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Behai. Id. The four major cities in-
clude Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Id. These regions enjoy much
greater leniency on the number and volume of foreign investment projects that the)
may undertake without the usual requirement of obtaining authorization and reviem
from the national government. Id.; see id. at 276 (noting that Tianjin and Shanghai are
allowed to approve foreign investment projects not exceeding U.S. S30 million. %hereas
Guangzhou and Dalian may approve projects up to U.S. SIO million). The remaining
nine are permitted to approve foreign business agreements up to U.S. S5 million. Id.
135. See Bonavia, supra note 15, at 38 (stating that the Guangdong province has
one of the highest smuggling rates because of its close proximit) to Hong Kong and
Macau). In an effort to curb smuggling activities, the Guangdong Provincial Govern-
ment enacted twelve measures. Id., see also Strike Resolute Blows at Economic
Criminals. Nanfang Ribao [in Chinese], June 15, 1980. at I. trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI
No. 76014, July 9, 1980, at 94 (noting that [the] grafters and embezzlers ver% often
put a thousand, ten thousand yuan, or larger amounts of capital and gouds into their
private pockets to squander).
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such as bribery,136 smuggling, speculation, and foreign exchange arbi-
trage became more widespread in these areas.137 To eliminate this cor-
rupt activity, the procuratorial organs launched an awareness campaign
emphasizing the negative effects of corruption on the economy. 38 Gov-
ernment officials specifically emphasized that economic crimes
threatened the four modernizations. 39 Although it is difficult to ascer-
tain the impact of such awareness campaigns, reports of economic
criminal activity in the zones throughout the 1980s continued to in-
crease three times faster than in non-SEZ areas. 40
The SEZs enacted legislation to curb the increase in the crime
rate. 4 1 For example, the Shenzhen Regulations stipulate that "illegal
136. See 1980 REPORT, supra note 50 (stating that there were 66 major corruption
cases in Shenzhen, forty of which involved briberies involving over 10,000 yuan).
137. Li Dongming, Crime in the Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zones, 4
SHEHUI [SOCIETY] 8 (Aug. 20, 1985) [in Chinese], trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI No.
86033, Apr. 25, 1986, at 48, 50-52. The increase in smuggling activity is attributed to
the transition from state-owned industries to more collectivized industries and ineffi-
cient management and accounting systems. Id. In addition, the open-door policy, which
allows freer access to these areas, makes smuggling possible. Id. The rise in the estab-
lishment of joint venture and foreign-owned enterprises, the influx of foreigners to the
SEZ, the growing availability of foreign exchange and foreign exchange certificates,
and the profit differential between the market and state-controlled rates of exchange,
are the prevailing factors for foreign currency arbitrage in the SEZ. Id.
138. See Firmly Implement the Open-Door Policy, Firmly Strike at the Criminal
Activities in the Economic Sphere, Fujian Ribao [in Chinese], Mar. I, 1982, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 24, 1982, at 3-4 (noting that a SEZ, the Fifth Provincial Con-
gress of Fujian, called for particular attention to "the struggle between capitalist corro-
sion and socialist anti-corrosion"). The SEZ employ more flexible measures under the
open-door policy and, therefore are more susceptible to crimes such as smuggling, ille-
gal foreign exchange, speculation and profiteering, soliciting, and accepting bribes. Id.
139. Strike Resolute Blows at Economic Criminals, supra note 135, at 94. Eco-
nomic crimes "corrupt[ed] [the] social atmosphere, corrode[d] and poison[ed] the ide-
ology of the people, and effect[ed] the consolidation of the proletarian regime." Id. The
campaign characterized economic criminals as "maggots that devour the people's prop-
erty." Id. at 94-95.
140. Li Dongming, supra note 137; see also Zheng, China's SEZs, supra note 133,
at 207-08, n.43 (discussing economic crimes in the SEZ). In 1986, an official of the
Ministry and Foreign Economic Relations and Trade wrote:
For the past few years, SEZs under the guise of "specialty" are [a] mishmash of
good and bad. Many individuals, units, [and] paper companies made use of all
unjust means and methods of speculation and profiteering to pocket money to the
detriment of the public interest. For instance, purchasing state-subsidized export
at low price[s] and reselling for extraordinary profits ... making many otherwise
profitable commodities loosing [sic] money by reducing price and competing with
each other, resulting in many of our long standing customers unable [sic] to
conduct normal trade with us. Id.
141. RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES OF GUANGDONG AND
FUiIAN PROVINCES AND THEIR STANDING COMMITTEES TO FORMULATE SEPARATE Ec-
ONOMIC REGULATIONS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE SPECIAl ECONOMIC ZONES (adopted
Nov. 26, 1981), reprinted in PRC LAWS, 1979-1982, supra note 8, at 255 (granting
special status and law-making authority to the SEZs).
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business operations" will be penalized.' 42 The term illegal business op-
erations, however, remains undefined.14 3 Similarly, if a foreign business
or individual is found engaging in a "direct profit making" business,
the penalties may carry a 20,000 yuan fine and the termination of the
business operation.4 Unfortunately, because the law is vague with re-
spect to the definition and elements of a direct profit making-business,
it is extremely difficult for a foreigner to comprehend the nuances of
the regulations.
B. TYPES OF SPECIFIC CRIMES
Because reliable information and statistics on economic crimes are
sparse and often incomplete, one must rely on the annual reports of the
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorates to
trace changes in criminal activity in any one specific area. A review
142. SHENZHEN REGISTRATION REGULATIONS art. 13, para. 3. The penalty is ei-
ther confiscation of the "illegal" income, or a fine of up to three times the amount of
the losses incurred through the illegal activity. Id.
143. Zheng, China's SEZs, supra note 133, at 224. Illegal business operations can
be illegal because either the activity extends beyond the scope of government allowed
business or violated substantive law. Id.
144. SHENZHEN REGISTRATION REGULATION, supra note 142, art. 14.
145. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing SAPA). Although
this Comment covers only economic crimes, a range of other economic offenses remain,
plaguing China. Id. These crimes fall under the jurisdiction of SAPA and, therefore
receive administrative penalties. Id.
Although commentators generally agree that China has had a significant increase in
the level of economic crimes since the enactment of its open-door policy, reliable infor-
mation and statistics are difficult to find and often incomplete. In addition, the lack of
data collection and case reporting and documentation on economic crimes make it diffi-
cult to trace the level and changes in criminal activity in any one specific area. See
1980 CHIEF PROCURATOR REPORT, supra note il7, at 44 (stressing the necessity of
making the legal sustem strong). From January until September 1980. 43% of the
cases dealing with economic crimes were cases of corruption. Id. at 47. There were 89
embezzlement cases involving more than 20.000 yuan. Id. at 47; WORK REPORT OF
THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES, 5th NPC. 4th Sess., (Dec. 7. 1981), re-
printed in New China News Agency (NCNA) [in Chinese], Dec. 14, 1981, trans. in
F.E.-6914, Dec. 24, 1981, at C5, C7 [hereinafter 1981 CHIEF PROCURATOR REPORtT](discussing that, for example, from January through September 1981. there ',Acre
31,000 criminal cases tried involving economic crimes and 16,000 criminal economic
offenses against law and discipline).
Offenses against law and discipline consist of corrupting social morals and causing
damage to state property. Severely Deal with Looting Incidents, Renmin Ribao [in
Chinese], Dec. 15, 1981, at 2, trans. in F.B.I.S.--CHI, Dec. 23, 1981. at KI. Looting
of state supplies is considered an economic criminal offense. ld.; 1981 REPORT. Supra
note 98, at Ki. Speculators, smugglers, and others who disrupted socialist economic
order received severe punishment. Id. There were 186 cases of smuggling, 5,243 cases
of graft, 1,138 cases of bribery, 2,011 cases of speculation and profiteering. WORK Or
THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, 5th NPC., 5th Sess.. (Dec. 6, 1982). reprinted in
Renmin Ribao [in Chinese], Dec. 17, 1982. at 2, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI. Dec. 21.
1982, at K8, KIO [hereinafter 1982 REPORT]. 250 cases involved over 100.000 yuan
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of the Court and Procuracy indicates that the following economic
crimes fall outside the jurisdiction of SAPA.
1. Government and Party Corruption
Under the Criminal Law Code, state functionaries, although not
privileged, receive preferential treatment in certain circumstances that
exempts them from criminal sanctioning. 1 6 In early 1980, a "crisis of
confidence" occurred within the Party and certain Central Committee
officials expressed concern regarding whether implementation of the
four modernizations could be successful. 47 During this time, the Party
revised its Constitution (CCP Constitution). 4 8 In an effort to have the
each. Id. From January through September 1982, 24,636 economic criminal cases were
heard. Id. Serious economic crimes rose to 32,605, in which 2,512 were classified as
major, involving money over 10,000 yuan. Id.; see Moves Against Economic Crimes,
AUSTRALASIAN CHINA REP., Mar. 1983, at 7 (reporting 164,000 economic crimes in
Chinese press in 1982); Legal Issues, SINO-BRITISH TRADE REV. Mar. 1983, at 10
[hereinafter Legal Issues]. 86,000 of the 164,000 were heard and 30,000 offenders
were sentenced. Id.; REPORT ON THE WORK OF STRIKING AT SERIOUS CRIMES IN THE
ECONOMIC FIELD, CPC Central Committee Discipline Inspection Commission Report
of July 25, 1983, reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], July 26, 1983, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Aug. 1, 1983, at K9 [hereinafter 1983 ECONOMIC CRIME REPORT] (as-
sessing the development of economic criminal activity since the implementation of the
1982 Resolution on Striking at Serious Crimes in the Economic Field). During the first
five months of 1983, 192,000 economic crimes were reported. Id. 131,000 cases (71 %)
were completed by April. Id. at K9. 71,000 Party members participated in economic
criminal activity. Id. Of these, 8,500 were deprived Party membership. Id. 170 people
acquired illegal gains amounting to more than 100,000 yuan. Id. 7,000 people had
illegal incomes amounting to more than 10,000 yuan. Id. The total amount of money
and property recovered equalled more than 410 million yuan. Id. Approximately
24,000 people turned themselves in for committing economic crimes. Id. Thus, in 1982,
there were 35,156 criminal cases. Id. In 1983 there were 51,486 criminal cases-a
46.3 % increase. Id.; see also Zheng Tianxiang Speaks to NPC on Economic Crimes,
Zhonghuo Xinwen She [in Chinese], Jan. 14, 1986, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Jan. 16,
1986, at K22 [hereinafter Zheng Tianxiang Speaks] (stating that in 1985 there were
48,400 economic criminal cases); Economic Crime Shows a Drop, China Daily, Dec.
31, 1987, at 3 (attributing the decrease in the rate of economic crimes to the effective-
ness of the anticorruption campaigns). In 1986, the Supreme People's procuratorate
announced a 40% decrease in economic crimes over 1986, but noted that the crimes
had become more serious in nature. Id.; Crackdown on Economic Crimes, 33 BEIJING
REv. 7 (Aug. 15, 1983) (providing a summary of the 1983 Economic Crime Report).
146. See CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. 192 (PRC) (noting that state functionaries
who fail to observe or uphold their official duty may receive an administrative sanc-
tion); see also Maodi, Chinese Discipline Should not Replace State Law, Jiefang
Ribao [in Chinese], Oct. 7, 1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Oct. 21, 1980, at L5 (noting
that party members often punish high-ranking officials of the Party through Party dis-
cipline instead of state law). Leading Party officials are often ignorant of the law. Id. at
L6. It is very difficult to judge crimes committed by Party members because they are
punished internally according to Party discipline. Id.
147. Inside Story on the Revision of the CCP Constitution, Cheng Ming [in Chi-
nese], July 1, 1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, July 16, 1980, at UI 1.
148. See id. (discussing the consideration of economic concerns in developing the
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CCP Constitution reflect "equality for all before the law" and the non-
existence of a privileged class and detect unauthorized or unlawful ac-
tivity, the Party amended the draft revision of the CCP Constitution. 9
The amendment upgraded and expanded the powers of the Commission
for Inspecting Discipline and established the Guiding Principles Gov-
erning Inner-Party Political Life."" The purpose of the Commission for
Inspecting Discipline is to report any violations of Party discipline reg-
ulations to the appropriate agencies at the appropriate national govern-
mental levels."' At the same time, the Chief Procurator of the Su-
preme People's Procuratorate issued a statement calling for a concerted
effort to fight unlawful activity by state functionaries."
It was not until 1983, when the Commission for Inspecting Discipline
released its report on economic crime, that the Party publicly recog-
nized and chastised Party and government corruption.6 3 The Commis-
sion identified lack of morals and inefficient management of Chinese
officials as the primary causes of corrupt activities.' 5' Some of the cases
exposing government corruption included charges of smuggling,5 0 brib-
ery,156 and embezzlement. 5 7 The real exposure of government corrup-
new CPP Constitution).
149. Id.
150. 1982 Editorial on Punishing Crininals, supra note 15, at K7. The Guiding
Principles for Inner Party Political Life do not allow state functionaries to use their
official position to receive private benefit. Id.; see Cadres Observing Law. Discipline,
Beijing Dom. Serv. [in Chinese], Sept. 7, 1980, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI. Sept. 8. 1980.
at L12 (relating the speech of Premier Hua GuoFeng of the NPC). The Premier called
on party cadres to set a good example. Id.
151. See Punishment for Squanderers of Public Funds, BEINc; RI: .. Aug. 18.
1980, at 6 n.33 (stating that the Commission imposed fines and disciplinary measures
on a deputy director of a local administration bureau for squandering 1.398 yuan of
public funds for food and entertainment). The Commission also imposed fines on a
cartons factory in Chongking for spending 1.430 yuan on food and entertainment for
its customers, while including the expenditures as production costs. Id., CCP Discipline
Group Tackles Economic Crimes, Xinhua [in Chinese], July 22. 1982, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, July 26, 1982 at KIO (noting that the Discipline Inspection Commis-
sion appointed its first 154 employees to aid municipalities in the detection of serious
economic crimes).
152. On Handling the Party Membership of Communist Party Members Who Are
Punished in Criminal Cases, Renmin Ribao [in Chinese]. Mar. 3. 1982. trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 9, 1982, at K13.
153. 1983 EcoNoN11C CRIME REPORT, supra note 145, at KIO-18 (reporting that
the most troubling concern for the Commission was the amount of government and
Party corruption).
154. Id. at K12.
155. See Customs Administration to Stamp Out Smuggling Activities. F.B.I.S.-
CHI, Apr. 16, 1980, at L6 (noting the state's goal is to stamp out smuggling in China).
In 1979, there were 13,400 smuggling violations, a 41 % increase over 1978. Id. The
total value of the smuggled goods exceeded 7.3 million )uan. three times more than in
1978. Id.
156. See Bribe-Taking Communist Party Members Arrested. Xinhua [in Chinese],
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tion, however, began in 1986 when high officials called for the death
penalty for those senior cadres membersas and their children"" who
engaged in serious economic criminal activity.'6 The incentive for cer-
tain high officials to expose the economic crimes of their colleagues'
children originated in the ongoing power and ideological struggle be-
tween the conservative Marxists and the Reformists.'
July 13, 1987, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, July 14, 1987, at K3 (providing an example of
bribery of a Chinese official by a Japanese merchant). In July 1987 the Central Disci-
pline Inspection Commission issued a Decision which expelled all Chinese officials com-
mitting bribery from the Party. Id. From January to May 1987, 185 Chinese officials
were arrested and expelled for committing bribery. Id., Southerland, Foreigners See
Rise in Bribes in China, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1987, at A I & A26 (providing examples
of the way bribery occurs in China). At one point, gifts were accepted as bribes in
order to help the breakthrough of Chinese democracy. Id. With the influx of foreign
investment in China, however, the Chinese became more selective in their options by
demanding cash or cash deposits in foreign bank accounts. Id.
157. 1983 EcONOMIC CRIME REPORT, supra note 145, at KI0-11. For example, a
factory director was convicted of smuggling over 23 million yuan in goods. Id. at KI0.
A county director received the death penalty after misappropriating more than 60,000
yuan in bribes and smuggled goods. Id. A bank accountant embezzled 1.03 million
yuan of bank money. Id. at KI 1. Certain state organs illegally traded over U.S. $1
billion in foreign exchange. Id. at K10; Cronin, supra note 107, at 13. A First Secre-
tary of the Party Committee of Luda was convicted of embezzling funds to construct
sixty-four extravagant clubs, hostels, and offices. Id. Similarly, a group of employees,
working for the Xian County Fuel Company, embezzled 161,000 British pounds. Id.
158. See Southerland, supra note 102, at A12 (defining a senior cadre as "an offi-
cial at the level of bureau director or above").
159. Lee, China's Next Great Leap Could Be Backward, Bus. WEEK, May 8,
1989, at 54, 55 (discussing briefly official corruption by relatives of Deng and Zhao
Ziyang).
160. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing the first occasion
when the state imposed the death penalty for economic crimes).
161. See Luo Ping, Notes on a Northern Journey: Doubts as to Whether Tigers
Are Butchered to Cover Up Things, Cheng Ming No. 103 [in Chinese], May I, 1986,
trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, May 14, 1986, at WI (highlighting numerous cases where
children of high officials were exposed and exploited for engaging in economic criminal
activity). The purpose of this activity, known as pulling "pigtails," was to expose the
commercial criminal activities of children of officials. Id. The children of the officials
are referred to as "tigers." Id. One example was made of Hu Shiying, the son of Hu
Qiaomu, a famous preacher of Marxism-Leninism. Id. at W2. A procuratorate sen-
tenced Hi Shiying to prison for embezzling over several million yuan in tuition fees for
a correspondence course in legal education. Id. Another example is of the son and
daughter of Zhen, allegedly involved in the Wang Chun case. Id. at W3. Wang Chun,
the former vice mayor of Beijing, was involved in a U.S. $300,000 bribery case and a
dereliction of duty act for misappropriating U.S. $2 million from the city treasury to
his son. Id. One of the first cases to receive nationwide publicity as well as to question
the constitutional right of equality before the law is of Ye Zhifeng and Zhang Chang-
sheng. Id. They were both arrested and convicted on charges of bribery and divulging
state secrets for leaking information concerning the import of foreign automobiles. Id.
On March 27, 1986, the Beijing's Intermediate People's Court sentenced Zhang, the
son of a senior army officer, to death. Id. Ye, the alleged principal offender in the case
and daughter of Ye Fei, a member of the Communist Party Central Committee and
former Navy commander, was only sentenced to 17 years. Id. Certain political and
[VOL. 5:161
ECONOMIC CRIMES IN THE PRC
2. Speculation
The relaxing of price controls combined with the increase in market-
oriented economic legislation during the early 1980s led to stark in-
creases in speculative activities.162 Since 1949, state regulation of prices
is common in China. The open door policy introduced a hybrid eco-
nomic mechanism which resulted in both a state and market controlled
pricing system. Subsequently, the applicable concepts of free market
profit-making and profiteering, derived from this hybrid mechanism,
have created disorder and misunderstanding among the Chinese."' a
In 1987, the State Council issued regulations concerning the manipu-
lation of state-controlled prices.16 4 The purpose of the regulations is to
increase control over speculative and profiteering activities.1 5 The reg-
ulations provides punishments ranging from fines to life imprisonment
depending upon the seriousness of the crime. 66
3. Contract Corruption
Another source of economic criminal activity is corruption in the
area of contracting. 67 From 1949 until 1976 the government imposed
strict administrative control over contracts entered into by state enter-
prises. 1 8 After 1976, due to the Cultural Revolution, the lines between
administrative control and regulation of commercial activities became
obscured, 6 9 considerably weakening the contract system and manage-
legal circles in China have asserted that she received a lenient sentence because she
threatened to publicly reveal several hundred names of senior officials and their chil-
dren involved in economic crimes. Id. These circles further contended that the motivat-
ing factor behind Zhang's death sentence was his potential threat as a %%itness. Id. at
W5.
162. 1983 ECONOMIC CRIME REPORT, supra note 145. at KI0. Trenty-seven per-
cent of all economic crimes in 1983 were speculation and fraud. Id.
163. See Crime in China, AUSTRALASIAN CIIINA REP.. Sept. 1983, at 27. 31 (ex-
plaining Chinese confusion concerning economic activities are legal and quoting the
crime statistics that resulted from this confusion).
164. Speculation, supra note 14, at 10.
165. Id.
166. See id. (noting that during the first six months in 1987, 240,000 cases of mar-
ket-determined price increases were discovered). In Beijing 17,000 profiteers were ar-
rested within the first two weeks after the implementation of the regulations. Id.
167. Leung, China Faces Huge Ideological Hurdles in Plan to Sell Shares in
State Concerns, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1989, at A12 (noting that China's contract system
is in a troubled state, partly due to corrupt government officials).
168. Dicks, A Legal Opinion, CHINA TRADE REP.. Sept. 1981. at II (noting that
administrative control consisted of various levels of approval. reporting. filing, and
verification).
169. See id. (discussing the evolution of administrative supervision of contracts).
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rial responsibility system.17 By the end of the Cultural Revolution the
contract, as a legally binding document, was virtually nonexistent. 17 1 In
the early 1980s, the decentralization of government control and the in-
crease of private enterprises172 brought an increase in contract negotia-
tion. To revive the concept of legally binding contract as a commercial
document, the government announced measures to implement an eco-
nomic responsibility system for industrial production.I 7 This necessi-
tated the creation of internal production management systems to reest-
ablish order in commercial trade.174
The paucity of economic legislation and appropriate administrative
agencies to analyze the results of commercial projects, however, ob-
structed proper implementation of the economic responsibility sys-
tem. " 5 By 1983, China had more than 200 laws regulating the econ-
omy, but only a weak enforcement structure.176 In recognition of this
weakness, the government created the Ministry of Supervision (MOS),
an individual state agency invested with the power to supervise and
prevent contract corruption in commercial settings. 7
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. States Share of Businesses Falls in China, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1989. at 28
(discussing the rising percentage of private enterprises and collectives in China).
173. State Council's Economic Responsibility Order, Xinhua [in Chinese], Dec. 6,
1981, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Dec. 7, 1981, at K20 (describing the contents of the
economic responsibility production management system). The function of the system is
to clearly define the rights, responsibilities, and interests of those engaged in industrial
production. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Yang Xueqi, Economic Legislation Should Be Strictly Enlorced in
Adopting the System of Economic Responsibility Among Commercial Enterprises. I
CAIJIN WENTI YANJIU (THE STUDY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PROBt FM5) 33. 33-37
(1982) [in Chinese], trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI No. 80512. Apr. 7, 1982. at 58 (stating
that economic legislation must exist to determine which economic activities are legal);
Shen Yiqing, The Scope of Capital Construction Must Be Controlled-Capital Con-
struction Policymakers Should Also Implement a Responsibility System so as to
Know Who Draws Circles and Who Takes Economic and Legal Responsibility' in Case
of Major Mistakes, Shijie Jingji Daobao [in Chinese], Mar. 21, 1983. trans. in
J.P.R.S.-CHI No. 83504, May 19, 1983, at I (noting that a causal connection exists
between mistakes in investment decisions which lead to poor capital investment oppor-
tunities and the failure to implement a responsible system among policymakers for
their bad investments). Although departments and divisions responsible for investment
distribution and financial supervision exists, a department does not exist to analyze the
results of the investment when the project is completed. Id. at I.
176. Yaowu Bian & Chichang Xie, Economic Legislation and Economic Rer'ornt,
Renmin Ribao [in Chinese], May II, 1983, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI. May 17, 1983, at
K5 (emphasizing the necessity of establishing an economic organiiational. administra-
tive, regulatory. and supervisory system).
177. See supra note I 10 (discussing the role of the Ministry of Supervision); see
also Ministryr of Supervision Helps Detect Corruption. Xinhua [in Chinese]. June 9.
1988. trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 8811 I, June 9. 1988, at 34 (praising the Ministry of
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4. State Secrets
Another economic crime that increased dramatically with the onset
of the Cultural Revolution was the divulgence of state secrets, a crime
rooted in the Chinese tradition of protecting the Party. '78 In 1980, the
government reinitiated previously ignored regulations designed to pro-
tect state secrets. 17 9 The Party charged the general Chinese populace,
government officials, and Party members with the responsibility of pro-
tecting state secrets. 80
The definition of a state secret is extremely broad, 181 making it easy
to violate the new regulations. 8 To violate a state secret three ele-
ments must be met:183 the offender must work for the state, the act
must violate a security regulation of the state, and the information dis-
closed must be of a serious nature.8 4 If a violation occurs, the appro-
Supervision for saving China U.S. S30 million by detecting corruption in foreign con-
tracts). Between June 1987 and June 1988 the Ministry of Supervision investigated
300,000 contracts negotiated with foreign companies and found illegal activity amount-
ing to U.S. S30 million. Id.
178. See Heighten Our Vigilance, supra note 96, at LS (explaining that guarding
state secrets is everyone's duty-the Party's, the army's, and the people's).
179. PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS ON GLARDI G STATE SECRETS. 5th NPC. 12th
Sess., (Apr. 11, 1980), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], Apr. 10. 1980. trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Apr. 14, 1980 at L7-1 1 [hereinafter STATE SECRETS L,.wJ: see Ching.
Protecting State Secrets, Chinese-Stiyle, Asian Wall St. J.. Apr. 18. 1980. at 4 (inter-
preting the impact of the implementation of the State Secrets Lax% in 1980).
180. STATE SECRETS LAW, supra note 180. at L 11.
181. See id. at L7 (outlining the contents of the new law). Rong Lie. What Consti-
tute [sic/ the Crime of Revealing State Secrets?. Guangming Ribao [in Chinesel. June
19, 1981, trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI No. 78678, Aug. 5. 1981, at 39 (defining the crime
of revealing state secrets). The second regulation of the Provisional Regulations on
Keeping State Secrets defines Party and state secrets as those encompassing all impor-
tant political, economic, military, and scientific and technological matters which have
not been publicized or are not permitted to be publicized. Id. at 40. The location, con-
tent, and consequences of the revealed secret determines whether a secret is serious. Id.
at 40; see also Debes, Multinationals Vs. The Snoops. BLS. WEEK. June 23. 1986. at
30 (discussing censorship of privileged information in developing countries). China's
method of censorship is manipulating or distorting germane data by classifying many
of its laws and regulations as neibu-so secret that foreigners cannot see them. Id. at
32. Foreign business people complain that this method hinders sound business transac-
tions and obstructs fair arms-length agreements in foreign investment decisions. Id. at
32-33.
182. See Zhiguo An, Crime of BetraYing State Secrets. BEIJING RE%.. May 17,
1982, at 3 (describing two separate cases in which state functionaries were convicted of
divulging state secrets to foreigners, after they unsuccessfully argued the vagueness
inherent in defining a state secret): It Is Necessary to Severely Punish Criminals Who
Leak State Secrets, Renmin Ribao [in Chinese], Mar. 27. 1982. trans. -in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 29, 1982, at KI (discussing in detail the famous case of Li
Guangyi, who was convicted of divulging state secrets to foreigners after losing his
defense because of the confusion concerning the definition of a state secret).
183. CRiSIINAL LAW CODE art. 186 (PRC).
184. Id.
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priate agency or branch imposes either an administrative or criminal
penalty depending upon the seriousness of the offense. For example,
when state secrets are sold for profit the nature of the offense is crimi-
nal, resulting in the imposition of the more serious criminal punishment
as opposed to an administrative sanction. 185 Those engaged in selling or
deliberately divulging state secrets to "enemies at home or abroad" or
to "domestic and foreign profiteers" are subject to a comparatively se-
vere punishment for counterrevolutionary crimes.""6 If the effects of
such violations are serious, even the death penalty may be imposed. 187
5. Tax Evasion
The recent imposition of taxes on Chinese people and businesses
spawned the crime of tax evasion. 18 8 Due to the relative immaturity of
the tax system, the percentage of noncompliance is very high. 8 ' Be-
cause of this noncompliance, China's past efforts to implement fiscal
reform by converting state-owned enterprises into tax-paying entities
have been largely unsuccessful.'
185. Id.
186. STATE SECRETS LAW, supra note 180, art. 13, at L1I. The language of the
regulations initially was not changed. Id. Terms such as counterrevolutionary and en-
emy could be interpreted as used during the Mao period, although the new Codes were
already in effect. Id.; see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing China's
history of dictatorship and democracy). Perhaps the purpose of retaining the old terms
was to effect a means of stressing the importance of the regulations since the populace
was still unfamiliar with and uninformed of the new Criminal Law Code.
187. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 103 (PRC).
188. See INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXATION PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS (promul-
gated on Dec. 15, 1986, and effective on Jan. 1, 1987), trans. in CHINA L. & PRAC.,
Jan. 13, 1987, at 7 (stating the appropriate income tax is based on yearly salary).
Taxes for individuals range from 20% for 400 yuan to 60% for 800 yuan. Id.; PROVI-
SIONAL REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE INCOME TAX OF
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES (adopted on June 3, 1988, and effective June 25, 1988), re-
printed in Xinhua [in Chinese], June 28, 1988, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 88131,
July 8, 1988, at 15 (discussing tax law of private enterprises).
189. See Tax Crime, China Daily, Aug. 22, 1988, at 2 (noting that 50% of
China's sate and collective enterprises and 80% of private businesses evade paying
taxes).
190. See Delfs, Extraordinary Items: Deficient Accounting Practices and Lack of
Organization Seriously Hamper China's Efforts to Implement Fiscal Reforms, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Nov. 10, 1983, at 101 (describing the results of a government inspection
of the accounting practices of China's industries); Banking, Finance and Investment,
AUSTRALASIAN CHINA REP., Dec. 1985-Jan. 1986, at 41 (reporting on violations within
the Agricultural Bank of China). Le Peijian, auditor-general of the PRC, announced
that an audit of 58,000 enterprises in 1985 revealed 89 billion yuan in tax evasion,
fraud, and waste. Id.; China Daily, June 16, 1986, at I (announcing a U.S. $51.2
million revenue loss due to tax evasion in the first quarter of 1986). This figure is based
on the audit of 9,044 Chinese businesses. Id.; China's Tax Auditors Find Fraud, Cor-
ruption, J. Commerce, Apr. 29, 1987, at 5A (revealing that in 1986, material suppliers
[VOL. 5:161
ECONOMIC CRIMES IN THE PRC
The most important factor enabling a high tax evasion rate is the
government's deficient accounting practices."' 1 These practices lead to
inaccurate or distorted reporting and high inventory losses at the plant
level. 192 In an attempt to address the problems of inventory losses 93
and deficits in state-run industrial enterprises and commercial enter-
prises, the State Economic Commission issued a Circular on Eliminat-
ing Deficits to strengthen accounting practices.19'
The government's tax collection practices also facilitate tax evasion.
All taxes are collected at the local government level for ultimate distri-
bution to the national government. Thus, local government officials
charged with collecting the business taxes generally own the businesses
required to pay taxes. Usually these local government officials/owners
have no difficulty finding "loopholes" to circumvent the taxes.
6. Application of Chinese Law to Foreigners
Because definitions of economic crir-'e in the Criminal Law Code re-
main nebulous, 195 the Code's potential sanctioning impact on foreign
citizens is often unnoticed. Both the Criminal Law Code and the Crim-
inal Procedure Code, however, apply to anyone, except diplomats,"'
found committing a crime in China. 197
evaded 1.2 billion yuan (S324 million) in taxes). Those businesses engaged in foreign
trade evaded $102 million in foreign exchange and S184 million in renminbi currency
in taxes. Id.; Auditors Discover 7 Billion Yuan Used Illegally, China Daily. Dec. 18,
1987, at I (noting that of the 119,000 enterprises and government units, auditors cal-
culated 7.6 billion yuan in misappropriated funds and tax evasion).
191. Delfs, Great Haul of the People: Pilferage and the Black Market Are Impor-
tant Factors Behind Industrial Disorganization, FAR. E. EcoN. REv., Nov. 10. 1983.
at 101.
192. Id.
193. See id. (attributing inventory losses to theft for sale on the black market).
194. See State Economic Commnission's Circular on Eliminating Deficits, Jingji
Ribao [in Chinese], Oct. 20, 1983, trans. in F.E.-CCHI No. 7477, at Cl. C4 (making
strict enforcement of financial and economic discipline a key component in eliminating
deficits).
195. See supra notes 97-98 (describing problems with the Criminal Law Code).
196. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. 8 (PRC); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 12
(PRC).
197. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. 3 (PRC); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 12
(PRC): see Cohen, Reflections on the Criminal Process. supra note 48, at 324-27 (dis-
cussing history of Chinese treatment of foreigners who committed criminal acts in
China); Vee Lee, Chinese-Style Justice Equals Chaos, Asian Wall St. J., July 25-26,
1986, at 6 (discussing how China handles Hong Kong Chinese as distinguished from
foreigners who commit economic crimes). It is very difficult to obtain case law in China
because of selective disclosure. Id. China does not keep statistics on the amount of
foreign criminal activity. Id. Although Chinese laws apply to all foreigners, overseas
Chinese from Hong Kong are the most severely punished-the severest penalty to date
has been the death sentence. Id. China does not recognize Hong Kong Chinese as Brit-
19891
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Presently, the Criminal Law Code only makes persons 1s and not
corporations or other business entities criminal subjects. 9 The inter-
mediate people's courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
foreigners.200 If a foreigner is suspected of committing a crime within
China, the intermediate courts have the option to deport,20 or to con-
vict that person according to Chinese law.202
Chinese law applies extraterritorially to foreign persons if the pun-
ishment for the crime includes a period of imprisonment exceeding
three years. 0 3 Before the 1982 Resolution on Economic Crimes, most
of the economic crimes carried sentences of less than three years im-
prisonment or criminal detention. 04 The 1982 Resolution, however,
dramatically increased the penalties to include sentences of ten years to
life imprisonment or death. 0 5 Due to this increase in sentencing, most
ish subjects, and thus, they enter China on "home visit permits" issued in Beijing. Id.
The British Consulate does not have legal standing to represent Hong Kong Chinese
arrested for criminal activity in China. Id. In addition, Chinese law does not extend
privileges granted to other foreigners to Hong Kong Chinese. Id.; Counterfeit FECs
Bring Jail Terms, China Daily, Aug. 13, 1987, at 1 (reporting that four Hong Kong
Chinese were sentenced to prison for terms ranging from five years to life for smug-
gling counterfeit Foreign Exchange Certificates (FEC)).
198. CRIMINAL LAW CODE arts. 3-8 (PRC) (defining jurisdiction only over natural
persons, not entities or corporations).
199. Zheng, Business Organization and Securities Laws of the People's Republic
of China, 43 Bus. LAW. 551 (1988) (defining concepts such as corporation, enterprise,
and other domestic and foreign business entities as legal persons). In civil matters the
corporation is recognized as a legal person. Id. The extent of a corporation's liability in
a civil action, however, is not clear from present legislation. Id.
200. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 15 (PRC).
201. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. 30 (PRC). Article 30 allows for independent or
supplementary deportation of foreigners charged with a criminal offense. Id.: see Radio
Lecture on the Deportation of Foreigners, trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI No. 86049, May
27, 1986, at 12 (interpreting the deportation law). Independent deportation refers to
less serious crimes, which may not necessarily require sentencing, thereby expediting
the deportation proceedings. Id. Supplementary deportation pertains to more serious
crimes and requires criminal sentencing. Id. Article 30 is a permissive law. Id. at 13.
The intermediate courts often consider the state of relations between China and the
applicable foreign country before making a determination. Id.
202. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability
of Chinese law to foreigners).
203. CRIMINAL LAW CODE art. 6 (PRC). This applies to those engaged in the fol-
lowing: the regular business of smuggling or speculating, id. art. 118; smuggling or
speculating in "huge amounts", id.; forging or altering official documents, certificates
or seals of state organs, enterprises, institutions or people's organizations which result
in consequences of a serious nature, id. art 167; or the extortion of money or private or
public property by blackmail which leads to serious consequences, id. art. 154. Terms
such as "huge amounts" and "serious consequences" are not expressly defined by the
code, but rather receive their interpretation through political means announced in the
anticrime and anticorruption campaigns.
204. See supra notes 145-94 and accompanying text (discussing economic crimes).
205. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing the 1982 resolu-
tion and amendments); Hong Kong Businessman Sentenced to Life, Xinhua [in Chi-
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laws and penalties concerning economic crimes now apply to foreigners.
C. POLITICAL MEASURES IMPOSED TO CURB INCREASES IN ECONOMIC
CRIME-ANTICRIME AND ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS
Since the codification of the Criminal Law Code and the Criminal
Procedure Code, the Party has launched many anticrime campaigns. 06
Although the Codes have established a legal foundation to foster a
more stable social order, the anticrime campaigns, coupled with eco-
nomic reform, have provided the impetus required for remolding the
social order. The campaigns and reforms also have served to police cor-
rupt activities born of the open-door policy by both influencing public
opinion against corruption and further defining the Criminal Law
Codes and sanctions. 07
The government launched its first state-administered campaign
against economic crime in 1982 after publicly acknowledging the sig-
nificant increase in economic crimes.208 The NPC, the Party Central
Committee, and the State Council adopted two resolutions defining ec-
onomic crimes and imposing harsher sanctions. The first resolution, the
1982 Resolution on Striking at Serious Crimes in the Economic Field,
defined smuggling, illegal peddling, corruption, bribery, speculation,
deception, and theft of state and collective property as serious crimes
nese]. Apr. 8, 1983, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Apr. 12, 1983, at E3. The Guangzhou
Intermediate People's Court sentenced Li Zhanyun from Hong Kong to life imprison-
ment for bribing and corrupting state officials and smuggling rabbit fur out of the
country. Id.
206. See Note, Concepts of Lan, in the Chinese Anticrime Campaign. supra note
50, at 1896 (1985) (detailing the history of Chinese law).
207. See Ching, China Responds to Recent Crine Ware with Swift Justice. Longer
Jail Terms, Wall. St. J., Aug. 4, 1981, at 34 (noting one of the reasons for the increase
in crimes was the negative influence of "foreign capitalist ideas"): Han Guang Details
Crime, Xinhua [in Chinese], July 25, 1983, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, July 27. 1983, at
K3 [hereinafter NPC Standing Committee Discusses Economic Crime] (noting results
have been obtained in China's attempt to thwart the upsurge of serious economic
crimes). Chen Pixian, Vice-Chairman of the Sixth NPC Standing Committee, con-
tended that the open-door policy necessitated the continuing struggle against economic
crime. Id. at K6. Han Guang, Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the
CPC Central Committee, noted that since the founding of the PRC in 1949. the num-
ber, frequency, scope, degree, and nature of economic crimes have been unprecedented
due to the open door policy. Id. at K4; see also infra note 15 and accompanying text
(discussing capitalist influences on the open-door policy).
208. Xi Zhongxun on Corruption, reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese]. Mar. 6. 1982,
trans' in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 8, 1982, at K4 (stating that a report was read to the
NPC detailing proposed punishment for serious economic crimes). Xi Zhongxun is the
Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and Director of the Commission of
Legislative Affairs; see Weisskopf, supra note 15. at A13 (noting that although crime
in China has been a problem since the 1960s, it was first publicly recognized after the
open door policy).
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which disrupted the economy. 09 The second resolution, the 1982 Reso-
lution on Economic Crimes Endangering Public Security 210 imposed
harsher sanctions than were originally imposed under the Criminal
Law Code upon state functionaries and people who committed crimes,
including persons who committed crimes involving large sums of
money. 11
In these campaigns, the Chinese government expressly linked the in-
crease in economic crimes with the injection of capitalist economic poli-
cies and ideology, a byproduct of the open-door policy.2 12 The govern-
ment labelled the activity a "manifestation of class struggle. '213 To
strengthen sanctions against these crimes, the NPC allowed the death
penalty for serious economic crimes and a minimum penalty of ten
years for other economic offenses. 14
The Chinese government and the Party experienced difficulty imple-
menting the new resolutions, however, because similar political mass
campaigns had a negative impact on Chinese society during the Cul-
tural Revolution.215 Thus, to implement the new crackdown on eco-
209. 1982 RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC CRIMES, supra note 86, at KI,
210. Id. at K2.
211. 1982 REPORT, supra note 145, at KI0 (stating that Chinese courts have heard
cases according to their seriousness and importance). Cases involving Party cadres and
large sums of money were heard first. Id.
212. We Must Not Relax Our Struggle Against Serious Economic and Other
Crimes, Jiefang Ribao [in Chinese], Oct. 7, 1982 at I, trans. in J.P.R.S.-CHI No.
82405, Dec. 7, 1982, at 37 (discussing the importance of addressing economic crimes
while preserving the open-door policy).
213. 1982 CHIEF PROCURATOR REPORT, supra note 101, at K21, K23; see It Is
Imperative to Severely and Expeditiously Punish Economic Criminals According to
Law, Renmin Ribao [in Chinese], Sept. 15, 1983, trans. in F.B.I.S.--CHI, Sept. 20,
1983, at K4 (discussing reasons for continued crackdown on economic crimes). The
class struggle is between socialist and capitalist ideologies. Id. at K5. One of the "poi-
sons" of capitalist ideology, the Party asserts, is degenerate morality, which pollutes
Party policy and social habits. Id. at K4; Government Calls for Crackdown on Eco-
nomic Crime, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Feb. 22, 1982, at K8 (noting the results of
economic crimes). Consequently, such activity has "inflicted serious losses on economic
construction, the nation's economy and the people's livelihood, dampened the people's
enthusiasm for strengthening socialism, damaged the Party's prestige, corrupted the
Party's fine work style, and inflicted inestimable political losses." Id.
214. 1982 RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC CRIMES, supra note 86, at KI; see WORK
REPORT OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE, 6th NPC, Ist Sess., (June 7,
1983), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], June 25, 1983, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, June
28, 1983, at KI [hereinafter 1983 CHIEF PROCURATOR REPORT] (assessing the
achievements of the Chinese procuratorial system from 1978-1983). The procuratorates
implemented the 1982 Resolutions to combat economic crimes. Id. at K3.
215. See Herbst, supra note 100, at 13 (noting that Mao used mass campaigns as
devices to effectuate criminal order). Mass campaigning reached its zenith during the
Cultural Revolution. Id. After the Cultural Revolution, the Party renounced the use of
mass campaigns. Id. Consequently, the enactment of the Criminal Law Code and
Criminal Procedure Code formalistically replaced mass campaigns. Id. In reality, how-
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nomic crimes efficiently, the Central Committee Discipline Inspection
Commission (Commission) issued several recommendations regarding
compliance with and enforcement of the new resolutions. 216 First, the
Commission placed heavy burdens on both Party committees and all
government officials, instructing them to abide by and enforce the new
resolutions.217 Second, the Commission called for adherence to the
Party line and for people to assist the State in enforcing the resolu-
tions.2 18 Third, the Commission stressed the importance of publicity,
using the newspaper, radio, and television media to announce the
crackdown on economic crimes.218 Finally, the Commission called for
strengthening of the public security, procuratorial, and judicial
organs.220
As the number of reported economic crimes increased throughout the
mid-1980s, 221 the President of the Supreme People's Court admitted in
1986 that the previous legislation enacted to combat economic crimes
was largely ineffective and the Court's sentencing power too moder-
ate.2"2 Consequently, in the following year, the government enacted two
ever, the mass anticrime and anticorruption campaigns of the 1980s are similar to
those run by Mao. Id.; see also 1983 Chief Procurator Report, supra note 215. at K4
(explaining that in 1982, of the 31,000 economic cases, the procuratorates decided to
resolve 17,000 cases by publicly charging the criminals as opposed to using the court
system).
216. 1983 ECONOMIC CRIME REPORT, supra note 145, at K16-18.
217. Id. at K13.
218. Id. at K15.
219. Id. The Commission recommended the circulation of reports and the publica-
tion of articles and commentaries on typical major cases. Id. at K17. In addition, se-
lected major cases were used as teaching materials for Party units. Id. The purpose of
this type of publicity was to increase public awareness and promote socialist spiritual-
ity. Id.; see, e.g., Strengthen Our Innunity, Renmin Ribao [in Chinese], Sept. 6. 1983,
trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI, Sept. 12, 1983, at K9 (utilizing a commentary to publicize an
example of an infamous corrupt criminal).
220. 1983 ECONOMIC CRIME REPORT, supra note 145. at K18.
221. WORK REPORT OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE, 6th NPC, 4th
Sess., (Apr. 8, 1986), trans. in F.E.-CHI No. 8231, Apr. 12, 1986, at CI [hereinafter
1986 CHIEF PROCURATOR REPORT]. The number of major crimes tripled in 1984. Id.
Some of the more major crimes involved bribery, embezzlement, and speculation. Id.
Monies involved ranged from several hundred thousands up to 10 million yuan. Id.
222. WORK REPORT OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, 6th NPC, 4th Sess.. (Apr.
8, 1986), trans. in F.E.-CHI No. 8231, April 12, 1986, at CI [hereinafter 1986 RE-
PORT]. The factors in determining the seriousness of a crime are the amount of money
involved and the level of damage to the reputation of the PRC. Id. at C2; see also
Zheng Tianxiang Speaks, supra note 145, at K22 (discussing new measures to more
strictly enforce economic criminal activity). Zheng Tianxiang is the president of the
Supreme People's Court of the PRC. Id. Several of the recommended measures were:
to impose harsher sanctions, to punish both parties engaged in bribery, to take stricter
legal action against government officials who were derelict in their duties, to take
stricter legal action against state and commercial enterprises as work units, and to
impose austere measures on those convicted of speculation and fraud. Id.
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regulations, codified in 1988, imposing harsher sanctions against those
suspected of smuggling,22 3 embezzlement, 24 and bribery.225 Similarly,
a surge of legislation to control economic crimes, supplementing the
Criminal Law Code and the 1982 Resolutions, erupted in the first
quarter of 1988.226 In addition, the government empowered monitoring
and enforcement agencies to play a stricter role in curtailing economic
crime in the government sector, collective enterprises, and private
industries.22 7
By mid-1988, however, a backlash resulting from these economic re-
forms struck Beijing,22s and the government began a slow retreat from
223. Considers Smuggling Rules, Xinhua [in Chinese], Nov. 17, 1987, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 87222, Nov. 18, 1987, at 22. People caught smuggling narcotics,
weapons, ammunition, counterfeit money, gold, silver, or other precious metals, rare
cultural relics, and any goods with a value in excess of one half a million yuan will
receive the death sentence. Id.
224. Id. Any person convicted of embezzling more than 50,000 yuan will receive
the death penalty. Id.
225. Id. Any person accepting a bribe in excess of 10,000 yuan will receive life
imprisonment or the death sentence. Id.
226. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STAND-
ING COMMITTEE REGARDING PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF SMUGGLING (adopted on
Jan. 21, 1988, and effective on Jan. 21, 1988), reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], Jan.
23, 1988, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 88016, Jan. 26, 1988, at II; SUPPLEMENTARY
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE REGARD-
ING PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY (adopted on Jan. 21,
1988, and effective Jan. 21, 1988) reprinted in Xinhua [in Chinese], Jan. 23, 1988,
trans, in F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 88016, Jan. 26, 1988, at II; see 2 CHINA L. PRAC. 12, 12-
13 (1988) (providing a synopsis of both of the 1988 Provisions on Smuggling and Cor-
ruption and Bribery); New Law to Check for Illegal Income, China Daily, Feb. 5,
1988, at 4, (commenting on the newly adopted provision pertaining to punishment for
corruption and bribery). Government officials suspected of spending more than their
legal income must be able to document their financial sources. Id. Those who are not
able to substantiate their income are subject to penalties not to exceed a five-year
prison sentence. Id. The average annual salary of a state official is 2,000 yuan. Id.
227. See Economic, Criminal Cases Targeted, China Daily, Apr. 21, 1988, at 3(discussing the heightened role of the Public Security Ministry in curbing economic
crimes). The public Security Ministry is also slated to receive independent decision
making authority in carrying out its tasks. Id.; Qu Yingpu, New Ministry Seeks Out
Financial Corruption, China Daily, Jan. 13, 1988, at 2 (providing examples of cases
investigated by the MOS). From September 1987 to December 1987, the MOS investi-
gated 379 cases involving illegal activities between Chinese firms and foreign compa-
nies. Id.
In 1988 economic crime-reporting centers mushroomed in China. Chengdu Citizens
Report Suspected Money Crimes, China Daily, Aug. 9, 1988, at 3 (noting for example,
that residents in Chengdu, a large city and capital of Sichuan Province, reported 390
cases of economic-related criminal activity in a one-month period).
228. See Tsui Ping, The Public Security Ministry Held a Meeting With Beijing
Municipal Leading Organs to Condemn "Revival of Liberalization," Cheng Ming [in
Chinese], July 1, 1988, trans. in F.B.I.S.-CHI No. 88126, June 30, 1988, at 28 (not-
ing that the student protests disturbed the Chinese officials). Various governmental
agencies attributed the instability of the price reform system and capitalist influence to
the student unrest. Id.; China Foresees "Turmoil," Wash. Post, July 7, 1988, at A29
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its open-door policy. The effects of increased economic crime on Chi-
nese society erupted in June 1988, when students of Beijing University
held rallies condemning corruption by government officials and de-
manding rights to freer democracy. 29 Government officials, fearing the
threat of social instability, 230 reacted by issuing warnings against im-
peding economic reforms and the open-door policy. 23' The students
reasserted their demands for democracy and an end to government cor-
ruption in demonstrations during the spring of 1989.232 The govern-
(attributing inflation, corruption, and income disparities to relaxed Part) controls and a
reformed pricing system).
229. Press Warns of Danger of Reforms, S. China Morning Post. June 10. 1988. at
8.
230. Ignatius, Chinese Leaders Will Seek to Maintain StabilitY at Annual Parlia-
ment Session, Wall St. J., Mar. 20. 1989, at Al I (observing that the Party expected
social unrest due to disparities in income levels and the high rate of inflation-over
30% in cities).
23 1. Id.
232. Ignatius, Death of E.x-Party Chief Hu Is Viewed as Blow to China's Liberal
Reformers. Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1989, at A9 (noting that the death of former Commu-
nist Party Chief Hu Yaobang stirred unrest among the Chinese students and intellectu-
als). Hu Yaobang was known for his strong advocacy of liberal reforms. id. His death
enabled conservative leadership to denounce liberal reforms and democracy. Id. Simul-
taneously, however, his death motivated students to loudly protest for democracy and
against official corruption, which the students and intellectuals viewed as an obstacle to
true economic reform. Holley. Students Protest in China. Wash. Post. Apr. 18. 1989.
at A18. Several days later, the student protests broke into a 15.000 people demonstra-
tion denouncing official corruption. Southerland. Students Press Protest Rallies in
Beijing, Wash. Post, Apr. 20. 1989, at Al. Protesters charged officials nith squander-
ing funds in foreign bank accounts and favoritism in placing relatives in government
positions. Id. In addition, the student protesters submitted a list or demands to the
government which included:
free speech and free press, removal of restrictions on street demonstrations, reha-
bilitation of those victimized by two major antiliberal political campaigns of the
past six years, public disclosure of national leaders* income, more money for edu-
cation, and a reassessment of Hu that would credit him for his contributions to
democracy.
Holley, Chinese Students Demonstrate at Communist Part' Compound. Wash. Post.
Apr. 19, 1989, at A21. The demonstrations escalated to over 150.000 participants
within one week, reflecting a sophisticated organizational leadership among the stu-
dents. Southerland, 150.000 Chinese March to Demand Democracy. Wash. Post. Apr.
22, 1989, at Al. During the April 22 demonstration the students called for a nation-
wide boycott of classes. Southerland, Chinese Students Call for Boycott of Classes.
Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1989, at A25. The Party called for a halt to the demonstrations
and labelled participants and activists "counterrevolutionary." Southerland. Beijing
Warns Students to Stop Protests, Wash. Post, Apr. 26. 1989, at A21. A government
official agreed to a dialogue to respond to the demands proposed by the students, but
the Party increased its statement that the demonstrations were a "planned conspiracy"
against it. Southerland, 100.000 in Beijing Mfount Defiant. Peaceful March, Wash.
Post, Apr. 28, 1989, at AI. Government officials called off a major crackdown on the
student demonstrators out of fear that such a crackdo%%n would cause the demonstra-
tion to spread possibly through China. Southerland, Beijing Calls Off Crackdown on
Student Protesters, Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1989, at Al. Government officials met with
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ment's imposition of martial law and the act of opening fire on the
student demonstrators2 33 crippled the student demands for an end to
government corruption, embarking on perhaps one of the strongest an-
ticrime campaigns in Chinese history-the results of which remain un-
known to date.
China's latest attempts to control economic crimes have led to sharp
reductions in capital investment. 23 4 For example, the State Council, in
leaders of the demonstrations, but rejected their demands. Southerland, Chinese Gov-
ernment Rejects Demands of Student Protesters, Wash. Post, May 3, 1989, at A 16.
Zhao Ziyang, in an effort to appease student protesters, agreed to "carry forward polit-
ical restructuring" along with economic reforms. Southerland, Top Chinese Official
Promises to Promote Political Reforms, Wash. Post, May 9, 1989, at Al. Zhao's
promise, however, had little affect on the protesters as they entered into a major hunger
strike, reiterating their demands for more liberal reforms and the halt of government
corruption. WuDunn, Hunger Strikers at Helm of China Protest, Wash. Post, May 19,
1989, at Al. The demonstrations rose to monumental and historical heights by May
19, posing the greatest threat to Communist rule since 1949. Greenberger & Ignatius,
Chinese Communism Faces a Crossroads as the Masses Speak, Wall St. J., May 19,
1989, at Al.
233. Ignatius & Leung, China's Hard-Liner Li Struggles for Political Survival as
Standoff With Pro-Democracy Protesters Continues, Wall St. J., May 23, 1989, at
A 15 (noting that the demonstrations began to weaken the internal leadership). Li, sup-
ported by Deng, declared marshall law on Tiananmen Square. Id. Zhao Ziyang gained
support from the protesters which threatened his position with the Party. Id. Li at-
tempted to purge Zhao by beginning a campaign to incriminate him. Leung, Military
Cast Kingmaker in China Leadership Struggle as It Seeks to Incriminate Party Boss,
Purge Followers, Wall St. J., May 25, 1989, at A 15. The government banned foreign
media from reporting in China. Kirkpatrick, TV: Transponding to and From China,
Wall St. J., May 26, 1989, at A9. Several days later, military troops rolled through
Beijing, marking the beginning of the bloody massacre of student protesters. Souther-
land, Troops Roll Through Beijing to Crush Protesters; Hundreds Feared Killed as
Chinese Fight Back, Wash. Post, June 4, 1989, at Al. Deng justified the military
crackdown by stating the need to suppress the "counterrevolutionary rebellion" of those
seeking to "establish a capitalistic republic." Kristof, Crackdown Backed, N.Y. Times,
June 10, 1989, at I.
234. Chinese Officials See Rapid Growth Continuing in 1989, Wall St. J., Jan. 20,
1989, at A18 (noting that austerity measures implemented in the fall of 1988 will
adversely affect foreign investment); Ignatius, Chinese Planner Presents Measures to
Cool Economy, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1989, at All (noting that the 1989 austerity
measures will affect future foreign contracts by giving priority to those contracts made
by wholly foreign-owned corporations); Greenberger. Ignatius & Sterba, China's
Harsh Actions Threaten to Set Back 10-Year Reform Drive, Wall St. J., June 5, 1989,
at Al (stating that the government crackdown which resulted in a bloody massacre of
the student protesters was likely to dampen foreign investment and restrict trade and
technology transfers); Foreign Investors Shudder Over China, Wall St. J., June 6,
1989, at A25 (noting the reluctance of many foreign ventures to continue investment in
China until the political turmoil subsides). The June 4 massacre made many foreign
corporations skeptical about future investment in China. Id. The United States, after
Hong Kong, is the second-largest trading partner with China. Id.; Leung, Chinese
Modernization Drive Flagging, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1989, at A8 (stating that the
Tiananmen massacre, coupled with the ongoing 1988 austerity program, stifled eco-
nomic modernization under the open-door policy); Ignatius & Leung, Loan to Build
Project in China Is Terminated, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1989, at A24 (stating that a
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an attempt to curb economic reform, severely limited the number of
financial institutions permitted to borrow foreign funds or issue bonds
in the international capital market.23 As a result, only ten of the more
than one hundred financial institutions in China are permitted to en-
gage in those activities.236 The current atmosphere in China is still in a
volatile state, thereby rendering it difficult to ascertain the level of ad-
verse impact that the latest campaign will have on China.
Ill. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Chinese are presently at a cross-road. They desire economic re-
forms, but the current pace of reforms appears to be progressing too
rapidly to assimilate easily into existing Chinese society.2 17 Economic
reforms outdistance the legal and economic policies implemented to
regulate efficiently economic growth and political change. When the
Party opened up the country's doors to the world ten years ago, it was
ill prepared for the tremendous influx of foreign investment.23 8 In reac-
tion to the amount of foreign trade activity and in an effort to appease
foreign investors' concerns, the Party codified new laws.239 In the
meantime, however, to stifle the increase in corruption, the Party re-
verted back to political mass campaigning-a signal of weakness in the
legal structure. 40
When tracking the economic criminal events of the past ten years,
the reasons for the economic slow down become more obvious. First,
the Party appears unable to control the amount of criminal economic
activity. Despite its major anticorruption campaigns, decisions, and res-
consortium of foreign lenders, including China's state-owned CITIC Industrial Bank,
terminated a $55 million loan). The reason for the cancellation of the loan is attributed
to the unstable economic activity since the Tiananmen massacre and high foreign debt.
Id. Foreign debt reached $40 billion at end of 1988. Id.
235. China Sharply Restricts Ability to Borrow Abroad, Wall St. J.. Feb. 16,
1989, at Al l.
236. Id. The remaining 10 are the Bank of China, Bank of Communications, China
Investment Bank, China International Trust & Investment Corp.. and the international
investment companies of the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan and of the
cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian. Id.
237. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text (describing the social unrest
resulting from corruption and economic modernization).
238. See Browning, After Tiananmen, Ominous Signs on Road to China, Wash.
Post, Nov. 5, 1989, at HI (stating that the United States is the second largest trading
partner with China). Trade between the United States and China surpasses U.S. $8
billion annually. Id.
239. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the
Criminal Law Code and the Criminal Procedure Code).
240. See supra notes 206-33 and accompanying text (discussing the anticrime and
anticorruption campaigns), see also note 145 (providing chronological numbers and
percentage of economic criminal activity).
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olutions enacting harsher sanctions, 41 economic criminal activity con-
tinues to increase. Second, the concept of decentralized power and lo-
calism in their nascent stages have greatly impacted the structure of
the Chinese government and society.242 At the outset of the open-door
policy, the majority of economic criminal activity remained confined to
the special economic zones. Now, increased regulatory power at the lo-
cal level throughout China creates more opportunity for economic
criminal activity.
The Party is also concerned with underlying changes in behavioral
patterns because of economic reforms.2 43 As noted above, during the
Maoist period the Party ruled by imposing fear and demanding that
Chinese citizens behave in an altruistic manner for the benefit of the
whole society. The demise of moral authority instigated rapacious
behavior.
More importantly, the Chinese succeeded in masking the inherent
problems of a developing economy by focusing on the results and conse-
quences of economic reforms publicly, instead of creating a foundation
to provide a transition from a state-controlled to a market-oriented
economy. The Party chose to highlight economic crimes, while only
haphazardly fashioning remedies to address the most significant
problems of economic reform, namely, political reform, centralized au-
thority, separation of powers, price reform, and inflation.2 44
The Party claims corruption exists due to the influx of capitalistic
influences and ideas through the open-door policy.245 It also, however,
continues to identify causes that are endemic to developing socialist
countries with centralized government authority. Political favoritism,
poor data collection, lack of managerial responsibility, a two-tier pric-
ing system, sparse and nebulous laws, and lack of independent judicial
power breed corrupt activity. It appears that capitalist influences
through foreign investment activities provide the opportunity for more
241. See supra notes 98-99, 164-66 and accompanying text (illustrating several res-
olutions that imposed harsher sanctions).
242. See Ignatius, Chinese Leaders Will Seek to Maintain Stability at Annual
Parliament Session, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1989, at All (noting that the increase of
economic power at the regional level signifies the decline of central authority).
243. Severe Punishment Should Be Given to Those Leading Cadres Who Violate
Laws and Commit Crimes, Hongqi [in Chinese], Feb. 16, 1982, at 6-8, trans. in
F.B.I.S.-CHI, Mar. 10, 1982, at K6-10.
244. Chinese Officials See Rapid Growth Continuing in 1989, Wall St. J., Jan. 20,
1989, at A18 (stating that the 1988 official inflation rate in China was 18.5%).
245. See supra note 15 (discussing the correlation between the open-door policy
and corruption).
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substantial criminal activity.2 46 Opportunity, however, does not amount
to causation.
Finally, despite the codification of the Criminal Law Code and the
Criminal Procedure Code, compliance with these laws remain an obsta-
cle to economic reform. It is difficult for the Chinese to rely on a legal
system that is tainted by memories of the Maoist period and the Cul-
tural Revolution. Legal education and understanding of the legal sys-
tem have not advanced past their embryonic stages.24 '7 To complicate
matters, legal education trains lawyers not to protect individual's
rights, but rather to protect Chinese interests in trade and negotiations
with foreign countries. 48
Arguably, individuals who are not protected by a legal system, who
have always believed that fa (law) is corrupt, and whose own beliefs
are founded in Confucianism and the concept of virtue will not abide
by the legal system's laws. The drafters wrote many of these laws to
promote foreign investment in the spirit of the open-door policy to
prove to foreigners that China could construct a sound legal base. Al-
though it is not clear whether the Party achieved this, it is clear that
the Party continues to impose severe punishment on the Chinese people
for benefitting from the open-door policy-a double-edged sword.
CONCLUSION
The 1980s mark the decade for combatting crimes in China, particu-
larly economic crimes. The Chinese commenced positive reforms with
the implementation of the Criminal Law Code and Criminal Procedure
246. See supra note 145 (sketching the rise in economic criminal activity).
247. China's Top Leaders Acknowledge Crisis in Education Polic', Wall St. J.,
Mar. 27, 1989, at A5D (stating that top Party leadership recognizes that education in
China is in crisis). China gave low priority to education during the last ten years. Id.
Approximately thirty-three percent of the Chinese attend elementary school and ten
percent attend high school or college. Id. A twenty-five percent decrease in high school
enrollment has occurred since 1979. Id.; RESOLUTION ON ACQUAINTNG CITIZENS
WITH BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF LAW (adopted Nov. 22, 1985), in PRC LAWS, 1983-
1986, supra note 8, 203 (specifying measures enacted to familiarize Chinese citizens
with the legal system). The Resolution includes all people. Id. Education of the law
focuses on the Constitution and civil and criminal law. Id. Legal education is taught
with ideological-political education at all levels. Id. at 204. The Resolution requires all
levels of local governments to implement programs promoting education about Chinese
law. Id.; see supra note 1, at 208 (noting that legal issues appear in popular media on a
daily basis); Gelatt, China's Propaganda Machine Turns Attention to Legal Educa-
tion, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1980, at 6 (describing the Party's methods for "popu-
larizing" the criminal code); see also Southerland, Chinese Police Execute 8 Criminals
in One Day, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1987, at A17 (quoting Deng Xiaoping as a propo-
nent of the use of mass executions as an instrument of education).
248. See supra notes 122 and 124 (emphasizing the lawyer's role in business and
foreign investment matters).
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Code. These codes provide a legal framework to regulate individual re-
actions to the economic reforms. The anticrime and anticorruption
campaigns that the Party launched serve to regulate and protect the
interests of Chinese society from corrupting influences. After ten years,
however, the individual measures to curb economic crimes have re-
sulted in few effective controls: mass campaigns and trials continue to
be utilized to curb social ills, judicial independence and responsibility
remain limited, class struggle is still prevalent, and capital influences
are still being blamed for societal corruption. Widely divergent income
disparities, stark price differentials for commodities, double-digit infla-
tion, and lack of a strong political reform are some of the reasons for
the current retraction of economic reforms.
The present government slowdown in economic reform may signal a
period of reflection to winnow through the melange of developments
over the past ten years and to reassess its policies and to harmonize its
laws with political resolutions. The retraction, however, is undoubtedly
a turn inward. While the door is not as widely opened as it was in the
past, it recently swung westward toward the Soviet
Union 9-movements worthy of tracking.
249. See Leung, Chinese Modernization Drive Flagging, Wall St. J., Aug. 14,
1989. at A8 (noting foreign leaders' concern that foreign sanctions against China due
to the Tiananmen massacre could "drive China into the arms of the Soviet Union");
supra note 30 (discussing political developments between the Soviet Union and China).
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